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Thousands of radiation portal monitors have been deployed worldwide to detect and deter 
the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials that could be used in nefarious acts. 
Radiation portal monitors are often installed at bottlenecks where large amounts of people or 
goods must traverse. Examples of use include scanning cargo containers at shipping ports, 
vehicles at border crossings, and people at high profile functions and events. 
 Traditional radiation portal monitors contain separate detectors for passively measuring 
neutron and gamma ray count rates. 
3
He tubes embedded in polyethylene and slabs of plastic 
scintillators are the most common detector materials used in radiation portal monitors. The 
radiation portal monitor alarm mechanism relies on measuring radiation count rates above user 
defined alarm thresholds. These alarm thresholds are set above natural background count rates. 
Minimizing false alarms caused by natural background and maximizing sensitivity to weakly 
emitting threat sources must be balanced when setting these alarm thresholds. 
 Current radiation portal monitor designs suffer from frequent nuisance radiation alarms.  
These radiation nuisance alarms are most frequently caused by shipments of large quantities of 
naturally occurring radioactive material containing cargo, like kitty litter, as well as by humans 
who have recently undergone a nuclear medicine procedure, particularly 
99m
Tc treatments. 
Current radiation portal monitors typically lack spectroscopic capabilities, so nuisance alarms 
must be screened out in time-intensive secondary inspections with handheld radiation detectors. 
 Radiation portal monitors using organic liquid scintillation detectors were designed, built, 
and tested. A number of algorithms were developed to perform on-the-fly radionuclide 
identification of single and combination radiation sources moving past the portal monitor at 
speeds up to 2.2 m/s. The portal monitor designs were tested extensively with a variety of 
shielded and unshielded radiation sources, including special nuclear material, at the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy. Common medical isotopes were measured at 
the C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital and added to the radionuclide identification algorithms. 
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Chapter 1                                                                                     
Introduction 
 
The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism has long been simmering in the minds of 
security experts. United States President Barack Hussein Obama’s 2009 Prague speech and 
resulting four nuclear security summits have heightened the public’s awareness of this danger 
[1]. Far from just being a dramatic television plot device, nuclear smuggling and nuclear 
terrorism are a genuine threat to global security illustrated by many reports of stolen nuclear and 
radiological material, interdictions of such materials, and threats by extremist groups to utilize 
such material [2–4]. 
Materials of concern range widely in their availability, their applications and their threat 
to society. Uranium enriched to more than 20% in the isotope 
235
U and all isotopes of plutonium 
garner the most attention. These isotopes are classified as special nuclear material (SNM) for 
they are the key ingredients that make nuclear weapons such powerful instruments of 
destruction. These materials cannot be found in weapons-usable form in nature, and instead 
require complex and costly industrial processes for their production, such as uranium enrichment 
facilities and specialized plutonium production reactors. SNM was produced in large quantities 
in the nuclear weapons states. While the vast majority of this material was earmarked for 
weapons programs, tens of tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium were 
distributed by the United State of America and the Soviet Union to other countries under the 
auspices of the Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s and beyond for scientific research 
purposes and as fuel for research reactors [5]. Some peaceful nuclear fuel cycle facilities and 
processes can also be used to produce or divert SNM. Therefore every signatory of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must agree to allow the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor all nuclear fuel cycle facilities through the application of 
safeguards.  
While the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) continues its efforts to repatriate SNM to the United States and Russia, 
and the IAEA continues its safeguards mission, no absolute guarantee can be made that SNM 
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will never be stolen or lost. The notion of terrorists acquiring SNM for an improvised nuclear 
device (IND) or indeed an intact nuclear device must be taken seriously. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s led to a prolonged period of instability in its successor states. 
Accountability for SNM stockpiles was no longer fully guaranteed. Some SNM left regulatory 
control through lack of security, corruption, and theft and has since appeared for sale on the 
black market. The IAEA registered a marked spike in reported interdictions of nuclear and 
radiological sources in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union as seen in their 
Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). The ITDB lists 442 reported radioactive material 
interdictions worldwide between 1993 and 2014, though only 21 of these involved SNM [6]. The 
number of successful nuclear smuggling incidents are unknown, though several extremist 
groups, such as the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo [7] and the Islamist terrorist group 
Al Qaeda [8], have attempted to acquire SNM and nuclear weapons in the past. 
While a successful nuclear terrorist attack remains a serious and devastating possibility, 
the vast majority of radioactive material interdictions involve radiological sources. Radiological 
sources, sometimes with dangerously high activity, are commonly used in a variety of industries. 
Industrial and medical radiological sources are not to be confused with SNM and cannot be used 




Co are commonly used in radiation therapy and in industrial 
radiography to inspect welds, and large 
60
Co sources are also commonly used for sterilizing 
instruments at hospitals and sterilizing food. A variety of radiological sources are used for 
treatments and diagnostics in medicine, backscatter gauges, smoke detectors, radioisotope 
thermoelectric generators and oil well gauging. When used by a trained technician, these 
radiological sources are a valuable tool in many industries. However, in the wrong hands these 
materials could be integrated into a radiological dispersal device (RDD), often referred to as a 
“dirty bomb”.  
While the destructive capability of an RDD pales in comparison to a nuclear device, its 
economic and psychological repercussions at the target site should not be underestimated. 
Industrial radiological sources may lack the stringent security protocols implemented for 
protecting SNM stockpiles. Historically, many radiological sources also were never disposed of 
properly. Such orphan radiological sources are a common nuisance at scrap metal yards 
particularly, and have led to a number of high profile and in some cases deadly accidental 
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exposures of radiation to unwitting members of the public [9]. Potential thefts pose a threat as 
well. In Mexico alone there have been at least three high profile incidents of vehicle thefts that 
led to national security alerts over the past three years because these vehicles were transporting 
radiological sources [10–12]. While in all cases the radiological material was eventually 
recovered and the thieves confessed to being solely after the vehicles and ignorant of the 
radiological cargo, these incidents nevertheless demonstrate the relative ease with which 
extremist groups could obtain such materials. In Iraq, the so called Islamic State has on multiple 
occasions stolen radiological sources, including from a university in 2014 [13] and from an oil 
field in 2016 [14]. The group has subsequently threatened to use stolen radiological materials in 
RDDs against nations in Europe who participated in air strikes against the Islamic State [15].  
The first line of defense must be to improve the security protocols in place for the 
protection of SNM and radiological sources and to find replacement technologies when feasible. 
However, these actions do not address the material already available in the black market and in 
the hands of extremist organizations. To detect and deter the smuggling of SNM and radiological 
sources, the United States has been pursuing a variety of policies that share one key 
commonality: the deployment of radiation portal monitors (RPM). RPMs contain detectors that 
will alarm on the detection of neutrons and gamma-ray photons emitted from SNM and 
radiological sources. These systems are commonly deployed anywhere a large volume of people 
and goods traverse some bottleneck, like a border crossing.  
A variety of governmental agencies and programs are involved in RPM deployment. The 
NNSA’s Second Line of Defense (renamed Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence) 
program has provided RPMs and specialized training in over 50 countries [16]. This program 
first started in Russia to address unaccounted-for nuclear and radiological material after the 
Soviet Union breakup. RPMs were installed at border crossings, airports and cargo container 
ports in order to prevent SNM being smuggled out of Russia. The 2006 SAFE Port Act by the 
United States Congress also required 100% of the millions of cargo containers entering the 
United States annually to be screened for SNM and radiological material[17]. The NNSA 
launched the Megaports Initiative which has installed RPMs at dozens of the world’s busiest 
cargo container ports so that cargo containers are screened well before they even approach the 
American mainland [18]. Domestically the United States Custom and Border Protection (CBP) 
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within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operates over 1,300 RPMs that screen all 
vehicular traffic entering from Canada and Mexico, all international mail entering the United 
States, cargo and luggage entering the United States on international flights and cargo entering 
the United States at major seaports [19,20]. 
1.1. Problem Description 
On a fundamental level, the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear smuggling has been 
addressed by the United States government through the development and deployment of RPMs 
both domestically and abroad. That is not to say, however, that there is no room for 
improvement. As will be shown, much time and money is wasted on processing non-threat RPM 
alarms. As will be addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters, RPMs operate on relatively 
simple principles. Neutrons and gamma-ray photons that interact in the RPM radiation detectors 
are counted. We live in a radioactive world, which means that radiation detectors will always see 
some contribution from background radiation. This background radiation varies across the world 
and through time because it depends on myriad factors such as local geology, weather, altitude, 
cosmic particle fluxes incident on earth, and many more factors.  
In general, the neutron background can be considered to be relatively small. Very few 
naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) emit copious amounts of neutrons. Instead, 
the small observable neutron background arises from interactions of high energy cosmic 
particles, such as protons and alpha particles, that produce showers of spallation neutrons when 
interacting with molecules in the Earth’s atmosphere. The neutron background varies spatially 
with altitude and the amount of atmosphere shielding cosmic ray-induced neutrons, and it varies 
temporally with changes in solar activity and other space weather phenomena [21]. 
The gamma-ray photon background, however, is orders of magnitude higher than the 
natural neutron background and can vary tremendously in space and time. The Earth’s crust 
contains a wide array of NORM, particularly from the Uranium and Thorium decay series. 
Concentrations of these ores vary geographically, and thus too does the gamma-ray photon 
background. Even at a given location, however, the gamma-ray photon background will vary 
with events such as rain which will temporarily increase an RPM’s exposure to the radiation 
from radon daughters [22]. 
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RPMs are frequently calibrated with the most recent background count rates. Alarm 
levels are typically set five standard deviations above expected background count rates. If the 
neutron and/or gamma-ray photon count rate exceeds these levels during an inspection, the 
appropriate alarm is issued. However, not every alarm is created equal. An alarm that is triggered 
by the presence of SNM, an IND, or an RDD is classified as a “threat alarm.” These are the only 
RPM alarms that matter to the CBP and a positive threat alarm will trigger a chain of events in 
the national security apparatus. As illustrated by the IAEA ITDB, threat alarms are exceedingly 
rare worldwide. However, in the United States, hundreds of thousands of RPM alarms occur 
annually that result in tens of thousands of hours of CBP personnel work, consuming tens of 
millions of tax dollars processing non-threat alarms [19]. 
What causes these non-threat alarms? A few of these alarms are “false alarms”. These 
alarms arise when natural background radiation exceeds an alarm level setting on the RPM. Such 
alarms can occur due to improper RPM calibrations but also due to statistical flukes such as a 
rare large cosmic ray-induced neutron burst or a rapid change in gamma-ray photon background 
following a heavy deluge. False alarms can be minimized through frequent RPM calibrations for 
natural background. Also, a tradeoff exists between optimizing the minimum detectable activity 
(MDA) and minimizing the false alarm rate depending upon how high above natural background 
the alarm levels are set [23–26]. 
The most common alarms, however, are “nuisance alarms” [27,28]. SNM and RDDs are 
by far not unique in their propensity to emit copious amounts of gamma-ray photons. In fact, 
many commonly-used and transported goods contain enough NORM to set off an RPM gamma-
ray photon alarm. The various radioactive isotopes in the Uranium and Thorium decay series are 
common throughout the Earth’s crust, so that many earth extracted raw materials and their 
finished products are naturally radioactive. These include common construction materials, such 
as granites, cement and bricks, phosphate derived materials, like fertilizer, and many other 
products, including cat litter that was estimated to account for a third of RPM nuisance alarms in 
2003 [28]. NORM triggered nuisance alarms are common in cargo containers and semi-trailers 
transporting large amounts of NORM-bearing cargo [29].  
Amongst personal vehicles, the largest and growing source of RPM nuisance alarms 
stems from nuclear medicine and nuclear diagnostics patients. A wide variety of gamma-ray 
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photon-emitting radionuclides are used in over ten million nuclear medicine procedures annually 
in the United States. While the most commonly used radionuclides in medicine nearly all have 
half-lives on the order of hours or days, the doses administered to patients in some procedures 
are large enough that patients who have very recently been injected with medical isotopes will 
trigger RPM nuisance alarms when travelling across international borders. The time in days it 
takes for a medical isotope to decay away sufficiently in a patient to no longer trigger an RPM 
alarm varies from a few days (
99m
Tc) to several months (
131
I) [28,30]. In 2005, it was estimated 
that greater than 1 in 2,600 Americans carried detectable levels of medical radionuclides [28,30]. 
While a wide variety of procedures exist, about 98% of nuclear medicine patients undergo 
diagnostic procedures while only about 2% of cases involved therapeutic procedures that 
typically involve higher activity sources. While over 17 medical radionuclides are commercially 
available in the United States for a variety of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, 
99m
Tc is by 
far the most likely isotope to trigger an RPM alarm, as it is used in over 90% of nuclear medicine 
procedures [28,30].   
  The issue with nuisance alarms is that currently-deployed RPM technology is unable to 
rapidly sort these alarms out. Current RPMs only provide gamma-ray photon and neutron count 
rates. Given an alarm, a second inspection will take place at a secondary RPM screening station 
to rule out a false alarm or a technical glitch. If both RPM stations result in alarms, CBP 
personnel must perform a lengthy inspection with handheld and spectroscopy-capable radiation 
detectors in order to locate and identify all sources of radiation that may have triggered the RPM 
alarms. As already mentioned, performing these inspections for hundreds of thousands of 
nuisance alarms annually is not a valuable use of CBP’s personnel and budget. 
In order to maintain a reasonable pace for the flow of traffic and goods, RPMs must 
perform their radiation measurement and produce a reliable result in the extremely short time 
span of a few seconds. This constriction requires the RPM to cover a large solid angle so that 
sufficient data can be collected in a very short amount of time. For gamma-ray photon detection, 
almost all deployed RPMs use slabs of poly-vinyl toluene (PVT), an organic scintillator. PVT 
has the advantage of being capable of being manufactured in large shapes. Other classes of 
gamma-ray photon detectors, such as inorganic scintillators and semi-conductor materials, are 
used in the hand-held detectors that CBP uses to screen out nuisance alarms. The material 
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characteristics of these detectors are such that they are capable of directly measuring the 
individual gamma-ray photon emission energies that are unique to each radionuclide. This 
capability allows for the application of gamma spectroscopy, in which detected gamma-ray 
photon energy peaks are compared to a library of gamma-ray photon spectra in order to identify 
all present radionuclides. However, these detectors often are impossible or prohibitively 
expensive to manufacture in the size or number needed for RPMs to be able to provide on-the-fly 
spectroscopic identification of radionuclides. The spectroscopic RPM has long been desired, but 
currently commercially available spectroscopic RPMs are sparsely deployed [31–33] and mired 
in controversy [34]. Much money was spent on developing spectroscopic RPMs that, in the end, 
performed no better than existing non-spectroscopic RPMs [34].  
Organic scintillators typically are incapable of measuring gamma-ray photon full energy 
depositions which results in the absence of the full energy photo-peaks necessary for gamma-ray 
photon spectroscopy. Organic scintillators nevertheless are energy-sensitive. For instance, 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has upgraded many of the CBP’s RPMs with an 
energy windowing algorithm that can screen out many NORM sources that have high gamma-
ray photon energy emissions above 1 MeV as opposed to the SNM emissions that all occur 
below 1 MeV [35]. This does not address all NORM sources or many medical radionuclides but 
this upgrade has already reduced annual RPM nuisance alarms in some cases by over 50% 
resulting in 230,000 fewer RPM alarms per year and 57,000 hours of savings in CBP personnel 
time [19].  A cost-effective spectroscopic RPM would result in another round of similar savings 
for the CBP by completely eliminating gamma-ray photon nuisance alarms. 
The cost and time saving benefits of reducing the number of gamma-ray photon nuisance 
alarms is the first priority in times of heightened security and tight budgets. A long term 
challenge for current RPM technology surrounds the use of 
3
He as the neutron detection 
medium. This gas is obtained from the 12.3 year half-life decay of tritium stockpiles produced in 
the United States and the Soviet Union for the nuclear weapons complex during the Cold War. 
Large-scale production of tritium ceased several decades ago. New tritium production is 
considered to be too cost-prohibitive as a source of new 
3
He production. In the United States, 
3
He is distributed to government and commercial users in annual federal auctions. Apart from 
RPMs, 
3
He is widely used as a neutron detection medium in nuclear safeguards equipment, 
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nuclear physics experimental setups, and in the oil and gas exploration industry. After remaining 
flat at around $50 per liter the price of 
3
He skyrocketed to $765 per liter for federal users and 
$2500 per liter for commercial users in 2012. While old 
3
He can be recycled and auction prices 
have stabilized, the 12.3 year half-life of tritium means that new supplies 
3
He will continue to 
shrink in the coming decades. Therefore there has been much interest in developing alternatives 
to 
3
He that would benefit not only RPMs but many other fields dependent upon a reliable neutron 
detector [36,37].  
 
1.2. Contributions from this Work 
This work presents the feasibility of using a variety of organic scintillation detectors in a 
RPM. One detector material functions as both the neutron and gamma-ray photon detector, thus 
eliminating the use of 
3
He prevalent in currently deployed RPM technology. Using a template 
fitting approach on cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the measured gamma-ray photon 
distributions, these new RPM designs are capable of performing on-the-fly distinction of a 
variety of SNM, industrial and medical radionuclides despite the short measurement time of less 
than three seconds. These new developments have the potential of significantly reducing the 
number of RPM radiation nuisance alarms that need to be processed by CBP personnel. The cost 
and time savings for CBP would be significant, and would allow CBP to devote more of their 
limited resources and attention towards their many other border protection duties beyond 
preventing smuggling of nuclear and radiological material. 
This work includes a large array of Monte Carlo radiation transport simulations and 
laboratory scale experiments. This initial research supported the construction of a pedestrian and 
a vehicle RPM prototype, both of which were tested extensively at a purpose-built facility for 
RPM testing at the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy. Both 
prototypes were able to successfully detect a range of SNM and industrial sources under a wide 
range of test conditions while also maintaining the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI)-recommended false alarm rate of less than 1 in 10,000 [38–41]. On-the-fly radionuclide 
identification proved to be successful for a wide energy range of gamma-ray photon emitting 
radionuclides. The identification algorithm was successfully extended to include over half a 
9 
 
dozen of the most common medical radionuclides thanks to measurements performed at the 




Chapter 2                                                                                     
Gamma-Ray Photon and Neutron Detection for RPMs 
 
The gamma-ray photon and neutron signatures measured by RPMs are typically acquired 
with slabs of the organic scintillator PVT and 
3
He gas-filled proportional tubes embedded in high 
density polyethylene (HDPE). Both of these detectors typically only provide gross count rates 
which are compared to background radiation count rates. For this work, organic liquid 
scintillation detectors are used for both neutron and gamma-ray photon detection. The properties 
and operation of these different detector types are introduced and compared. 
2.1. Inorganic Scintillation Detectors 
In the field of gamma-ray spectroscopy, inorganic scintillators with high detector material 
density and high atomic number are favored as these parameters affect the degree of attenuation 
of gamma-ray photons, i.e. intrinsic detection efficiency, and the probability of the gamma-ray 
photons undergoing photoelectric absorption, respectively, as show in equations (2-1) and (2-2) 
below: 
                                                  1 −
𝐼
𝐼0





,                                                   (2-1) 
                                                𝜏 ≅ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ∗
𝑍𝑛
𝐸𝛾
3.5,                                                     (2-2) 
where I and I0 are the number of transmitted gamma-ray photons with and without the presence 
of an absorber of density ρ, thickness t, and linear attenuation coefficient µ. For (2-2), 𝜏 is the 
probability of a gamma-ray photon undergoing photoelectric absorption as a function of the 
detector atomic number 𝑍 to an exponent 𝑛 that can vary between 4 and 5, and the incident 
gamma-ray photon energy 𝐸𝛾[42]. In a photoelectric absorption, the entire incident gamma-ray 
photon is absorbed by the absorber atom resulting in the subsequent emission of a photoelectron 
from the k-shell with energy equaling the incident gamma-ray photon less the typically 
negligible binding energy of the photoelectron. These photoelectrons then cause excitations 
while traversing the inorganic scintillator and the subsequent de-excitations emit scintillation 
light photons. These scintillation photons are the information carrier and proportional to the 
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energy deposited by the gamma-ray photons in the detector. The brightness of an inorganic 
scintillator is defined as the number of scintillation photons emitted per unit of energy deposited 
in the crystal. The crystal may be painted or wrapped in a diffuse or reflective tape so that the 
scintillation photons are collected at the unpainted or unwrapped surface to which the 
photocathode is coupled. At the photocathode, typically a Bialkali material, the scintillation 
photons now undergo the photoelectric absorptions. The probability of this interaction varies 
with the scintillation photon wavelength, so photocathode materials must be chosen carefully to 
match the specific inorganic scintillator scintillation photon emission wavelength spectrum as to 
maximize the quantum efficiency, defined as the ratio of the number of photoelectrons emitted 
by the photocathode to the number of incident scintillation photons. The photoelectron signal 
then finally is amplified through a series of dynodes at high voltage called a photomultiplier tube 
(PMT) [42]. Alternatively, a solid state light sensor known as a silicon photomultiplier (SiPM) 
has shown promise as a light readout for scintillation photons. SiPMs are much more compact 
than PMTs and require a much lower applied voltage to operate [43]. 
Therefore gamma-ray photons undergoing photoelectric absorption in an inorganic 
scintillator may result in signal pulses with amplitude directly proportional to the original 
incident gamma-ray photon energy. When plotted as a pulse height distribution, these pulses 
result in photopeaks corresponding to the incident gamma-ray photon energies which are unique 
to each radionuclide. These radioisotope-specific photopeaks allow a spectroscopist to identify 
the radionuclides present in a pulse height spectrum. Photopeaks exhibit a Gaussian shape, and 
the sharpness of photopeaks and the ability to separate adjacent peaks in energy determine the 
resolution of the detector which is often expressed as the ratio of the photopeak full width at half 
maximum and the photopeak energy [42]. 
  However, not all gamma-ray photons will undergo photoelectric absorption. Compton 
scattering is defined as an interaction in which an incident gamma-ray photon imparts only some 
of its energy to a recoil electron and is deflected at a scatter angle with diminished energy. This 
is often the most common interaction for gamma-ray photons. The recoil electron is imparted 
energy (𝐸𝑒−) equal to the difference between the incident and scattered photon and it otherwise 
behaves identically to the previously described photoelectron. The scattered photon energy, and 
thus also the recoil electron energy, depends upon the scatter angle 𝜃 as shown in (2-3): 
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                            𝐸𝑒− = ℎ𝑣 − ℎ𝑣






,                                         (2-3)   
where ℎ𝑣′ and ℎ𝑣 are the scattered and incident gamma-ray photon energies, and 𝑚0𝑐
2 is the 
electron rest mass energy. As the scatter angle can vary from zero to 𝜋 this leads to the Compton 
continuum. The Compton continuum is bounded on the lower end by grazing scatters in which 
almost no energy is imparted upon the recoil electron. The Compton continuum does not, 
however, stretch all the way to the photopeak as the maximum energy the recoil electron can 
receive occurs in a head-on collision at 𝜃 = 𝜋 as shown in (2-4). This maximum is known as the 
Compton edge: 








).                                         (2-4)    
2.2. Organic Scintillation Detectors 
 Almost all RPMs, however, do not use inorganic scintillation detectors for gamma-ray 
photon detection. Instead they use PVT, an organic scintillation detector consisting mostly of 
hydrogen and carbon. Three major categories of organic scintillators include organic crystals 
(stilbene, anthracene), organic plastics (PVT), and organic liquids (EJ309). Though vastly 
different in physical appearance they all depend upon the same radiation detection mechanisms. 
The effective atomic number of organic scintillation detectors is very low. Therefore the 
probability of photoelectric absorption of gamma-ray photons is exceedingly rare for incident 
gamma-ray photon energies over 100 keV. Nearly all gamma-ray photon interactions involve 
Compton scattering. Thus organic scintillation detectors are typically ill-suited for gamma-ray 
photon spectroscopy as they produce spectra with no photopeaks. However, some attempts have 
been made at loading scintillators with high atomic number additives, like bismuth, [44,45], or 
using deconvolution algorithms [32] to achieve some ability to perform gamma ray spectroscopy 
with organic scintillation detectors. 
 Organic scintillation detectors are not only sensitive to gamma-ray photons, but are also 
efficient detectors for fast neutrons. As organic scintillators consist predominantly of low-atomic 
number materials, like hydrogen and carbon, the most probable interaction for fast neutrons is 
elastic scattering in which some of the incident neutron kinetic energy is transferred to the recoil 
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nucleus. The resulting recoil nucleus of energy 𝐸𝑅 will cause excitations in the scintillator which 
will lead to the emission of scintillation photons, similar to the process already described for 
photoelectron and recoil electrons for gamma-ray photon photoelectric absorption and Compton 
scattering. The resulting recoil nucleus energy for a fast neutron of energy 𝐸𝑛 elastic scattering 
depends upon both its scattering angle 𝜃 and the recoil nucleus atomic mass number 𝐴 as shown 
in (2-5) below: 
                                     𝐸𝑅 =
4𝐴
(1+𝐴)2
(cos2(𝜃))𝐸𝑛, 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
𝜋
2
.                              (2-5)    
(2-5) shows that for a head on collision (𝜃 = 0) on hydrogen (𝐴 = 1) the entire incident neutron 




effectively zero energy is transferred to the recoil nucleus. For recoil nuclei heavier than 
hydrogen, the maximum fractional energy transfer in neutron elastic scattering decreases rapidly 
with increasing recoil nucleus atomic mass number. For instance, for the other main constituent 
of organic scintillators, carbon (𝐴 = 12), the maximum possible energy transfer to the recoil 
carbon nucleus is only 28.4% of the incident fast neutron energy. 
For both gamma-ray photon and neutron interactions, the energy deposited in the detector 
is directly related to the measured light output measured in units of keVee (keV electron 
equivalent). While the ratio between deposited energy in keV and light output in keVee is 
defined as one-to-one for gamma-ray photon interactions, the relationship between deposited 
energy and light output is non-linear and significantly less than one-to-one for heavier particles 
like the recoil protons from neutron elastic scattering. 
Calibrating organic liquid scintillation detectors for their response to gamma-ray photons 
involves measuring their response to a series of mono-energetic gamma-ray photon sources. One 
popular choice is the 
137
Cs 662 keV gamma-ray photon that according to equation (2-4) should 
result in a visible Compton edge at 478 keVee light output. Measured 
137
Cs pulse height 
distributions (PHDs) are shown in Figure 2-1a from a variety of organic scintillation detectors. 
These PHDs are simply histograms of the pulse heights for all measured pulses. For the 
particular digitizer used, pulse heights can vary between zero and two volts.  For the gamma-ray 
photon calibration, one simply needs the location in volts of the Compton edge of known energy. 
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This value is then used for linear conversion of deposited energy to light output. Picking the 
exact location of the Compton edge, however, is not trivial, because one must include the effects 
of the inherent resolution of the detector. Using a Monte Carlo particle transport code, like 
MCNP6, one can obtain both simulated un-broadened and resolution broadened PHDs for 
137
Cs, 
both of which have been normalized and are shown in Figure 2-1b. The true Compton Edge is 
given by the peak of the un-broadened simulation. The location where this peak intersects with 
the Compton edge of the simulated resolution broadened PHD tells one what percentage of the 
Compton edge peak to use for calibration purposes. This value can then be used to convert 
measured PHDs from the digitizer units of volts to light output with units of keVee, as shown in 
Figure 2-1b. For many organic liquid scintillation detectors a calibration value of approximately 
80% of the 
137
Cs Compton edge peak leads to good agreement between measurement and 
simulation taking into account detector resolution.  For larger volume detectors, however, like 
the 25 cm by 25 cm by 10 cm BC501A liquid organic scintillation detector shown in Figure 2-
1b, multiple scattering effects result in a much larger percentage of the Compton edge peak (e.g. 
96% for the BC501A detector) being necessary for calibrations. 
 
Fig. 2-1. (a) Examples of 
137
Cs PHDs obtained with a variety of organic liquid scintillation detectors such as liquids 
(EJ309), plastics (BB3) and crystals (stilbene). Pulse heights are still in digitizer units of volts, and no energy 
calibration has taken part yet. (b) MCNP6 simulated un-broadened and resolution broadened PHDs for 
measurements of 
137
Cs with a 25 cm by 25 cm by 10 cm BC501A liquid organic scintillation detector reveal that a 
calibration value of 96% of the Compton edge peak should be set to equal the 478 keV Compton edge. This 
conversion is used to convert the measured 
137
Cs PHD from volts to light output in keVee. 
 In traditional PVT organic scintillator RPMs, the contribution of neutron elastic 
scattering to the PVT signal is accepted as a negligible nuisance relative to the contributions of 
gamma-ray photon Compton scattering interactions. For background radiation alone, the gamma-
ray photon count rate in the PVT will be around three orders of magnitude higher than the 





He proportional tubes. However, for some organic scintillation detectors one can 
distinguish the light pulses arising from neutron versus gamma-ray photon interactions through 
pulse shape discrimination (PSD) with the charge integration method. 
2.2.1. Pulse-Shape Discrimination via the Charge Integration Method 
 As previously described, the recoil electrons and recoil protons resulting from gamma-ray photon 
Compton scattering and neutron elastic scattering interactions in the organic scintillator will cause 
excitations in the detectors material. The subsequent de-excitations result in the emission of visible light 
that is collected at the photocathode. In the 1950s, it was discovered for organic scintillators like stilbene 
and anthracene that this light has both a prompt and a delayed component, and the heavier the interacting 
particle (alpha particle versus neutron vs gamma-ray photon), the greater the fraction of the total light 
emission occurred as part of the delayed component [46,47], as shown in Figures 2-2a and 2-2b. 
 
Fig. 2-2. (a) On the left is one of the first measurements showing increasing delayed scintillation light component 
with increasing mass (stopping power) of incident radiation on organic scintillator (stilbene) [47]; (b) On the right, 
typical pulses for EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detector showing increased delayed light component for neutron 
vs gamma-ray photon interaction, thus forming basis for PSD. 
 
The underlying physics of this prompt versus delayed scintillation components were 
described in the 1960s [48]. For organic molecules with 𝜋-electron structure (such as organic 
scintillators), the energy levels of the molecule include both a number of singlet and triplet 
excited states (see Figure 2-3). Energy from the recoil electrons and recoil protons is absorbed by 
exciting the electron configurations of the organic scintillator molecules to the excited states 
shown in Figure 2-3. Transitions between the 𝑆10 excited singlet state and any of the 𝑆0# ground 
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states occurs with an exponential decay with decay time constant of a few nanoseconds. This 
light emission therefore is relatively fast and contributes to the prompt scintillation light 
component shown in Figure 2-2b. This process is known as fluorescence. Singlet excited states 
can also be converted to triplet states. The lifetime of the triplet states, like 𝑇1, however, is much 
longer (~10−3 𝑠). Therefore de-excitations from triplet states contribute to the delayed 
scintillation light component and are known as phosphorescence. When two molecules that have 
been excited to a triplet state meet while migrating, they will annihilate to a molecule in the 
ground state and a singlet excited state molecule. This triplet-triplet annihilation thus also 
contributes to the delayed scintillation light component. Therefore a greater concentration of 
triplet states would lead to a higher probability of triplet-triplet annihilation and thus an increased 
delayed scintillation light component. The Bethe formula, equation (2-6) for stopping power 
shows that heavier particles, like recoil protons versus recoil electrons, travel more slowly 
through the detector material and have a shorter range, thus depositing their energy in a smaller 
volume and thus creating a greater density of triplet excited states: 






,                                                     (2-6) 
where 𝑣 is the velocity of the exciting particle (recoil electron, recoil proton) and 𝑧𝑒 is its charge. 
As shown in Figure 2-2a, heavier incident particles lead to a greater delayed light scintillation 
light fraction in organic scintillators. This is related to the linear energy transfer rate of the 
exciting particle and its effects on triplet state density. Recoil electrons from gamma-ray photon 
Compton scattering produce lower triplet state density than heavier and slower recoil protons 
from fast neutron elastic scattering which produce lower triplet state density than the even 
heavier and slower alpha particles, thus leading to the differences in delayed scintillation light 




Fig. 2-3. Energy levels for organic molecule with 𝜋-electron structure with singlet and triplet excited states. 
The de-excitation of these states (fluorescence and phosphoresence) cause the prompt and delayed scintillation light 
components in organic scintillators [48].  
When one plots the tail and total integral for organic scintillator pulses, like those shown 
in Figure 2-2b as a density plot, one can see distinct bands from gamma-ray photon and neutron 
interactions, where the neutron band clearly exhibits a larger tail integral on average. An 
example of such a PSD plot is shown in Figure 2-4 for a 
252
Cf measurement with a liquid organic 
scintillation detector. A discrimination curve separates these two bands and all interactions above 
this curve are classified as neutron interactions and all interaction below this curve are classified 
as gamma-ray photon interactions. 
 
Fig. 2-4. Pulse shape discrimination for measurement of  
252




When creating a PSD plot, as shown in Figure 2-4, the user’s goal will be to minimize the 
amount of misclassification, i.e. gamma-ray photon interactions being misclassified as neutron 
interactions and vice versa. This is best achieved by maximizing the separation between the two 
PSD bands. While this depends heavily upon detector material characteristics, the user also plays 
a critical role in the quality of the PSD via the choice of the PSD integral windows and the 
choice of the PSD discrimination curve. Going back to Figure 2-2b, the user must choose where 
to start the tail integral and where to set bounds for the total integral. These settings will affect 
the slopes of the PSD bands as well as the PSD quality. The PSD quality is often expressed with 
a figure of merit (FOM), as shown in equation (2-7) below: 
                                              𝐹𝑂𝑀 =
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑁−𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑑𝐺
𝐹𝑊𝐻𝑀𝑁+𝐹𝑊𝐻𝑀𝐺
,                                            (2-7) 
where the centroids and full-width-half-maxima (FWHM) are taken from the fitted 
Gaussian distributions of the neutron and gamma-ray photon distributions when plotting the 
histograms of the tail-to-total integral ratios, as shown for Figure 2-5. The greater the separation 
between the two Gaussian distributions and the narrower the two distribution are individually, 
the greater the FOM will be for the PSD. Using linear slices of a PSD plot containing mixed 
neutron and gamma-ray photon data, such as Figure 2-4, one obtains Gaussian fits, like those in 
Figure 2-5, for each individual slice. Picking the point of minimum misclassification of photons 
and neutrons for the two fitted Gaussians for each individual slice provides a dataset to which the 
PSD discrimination curve can be fitted. The curve, as shown in Figure 2-4, is quadratic and has 
three coefficients. The user might choose to bias the curve, however, if say a lower 
misclassification rate of gamma-ray photons as neutrons is more important than a low 
misclassification rate of neutrons as gamma-ray photons. The process of creating this PSD curve 




Fig. 2-5. Histogram of tail-to-total integral ratio for 
252
Cf data acquired with 25 cm by 25 cm by 10 cm 
BC501A organic liquid scintillation detector. Fitted Gaussian distributions for gamma-ray photons (left, blue) and 
neutrons (right, yellow) are used for calculating FOM using equation (2-7) [49]. 
 
2.2.2. Types of organic scintillation detectors used 
 
Organic scintillation detectors are manufactured from a variety of material forms (liquids, 
crystals, plastics) and come in many different shapes and sizes. The detectors and their respective 
PMT light readouts used in the experiments discussed in this dissertation are listed in Table 1-1, 
and the material properties of these detectors are listed in Table 2-2. An example of the typical 
composition of an organic scintillator coupled to a PMT is given in Figure 2-6. Figure 2-7 shows 















 Name Manufacturer Model # Manufacturer Model # 
Liquid 
























































1.1 57 10 NA Yes 
Liquid 
EJ-301/BC501A 0.874 78 3.2 26 Yes 
EJ-309 0.959 75 3.5 144 Yes 
Stilbene Inrad Optics 1.16 >75 4.5 125 Yes 







Fig. 2-6. Example of standard composition of an organic scintillation detector coupled to a PMT. Detector 
cell could be a crystal (stilbene), plastic (BB3, EJ299-33,) or, as in this cases, a liquid cell (EJ309). 
 
Fig. 2-7. Examples of the detectors used in measurements in this dissertation including from left to right: 
7.62 𝑐𝑚 ∅ 𝐸𝐽309 organic liquid scintillation detector, 12.7 𝑐𝑚 ∅ 𝐸𝐽309 organic liquid scintillation detector, 25 cm 
by 25 cm by 10 cm BC501A organic liquid scintillation detector, 5.08 𝑐𝑚 ∅  stilbene crystal couple to PMT 
(5.08 𝑐𝑚 ∅ BB3 plastic scintillator looks identical when wrapped and coupled to PMT). Pictures are not to scale 
relative to each other. 
2.2.3 Digital acquisition systems 
 The block diagram in Figure 2-8 shows a typical measurement setup. The organic 
scintillation detector PMT is powered by a high voltage power supply. The PMT anode signal is 








scintillation light output is sampled and digitized (i.e. for each pulse only a set of pulse heights 
sampled at equidistant time intervals are saved). For each pulse this PHD dataset and the time 
stamp of the pulse are transferred via USB cable or optical link to a computer. Acquisition 
software is used to set parameters such as the acquisition window for each pulse, the trigger 
threshold for acquiring/saving pulses, the measurement time, and many other parameters. A post-
processing script is then used to perform PSD on all pulses and determine the user desired 
outputs like neutron and gamma-ray count rates or PHDs. 
 
Fig. 2-8. Block diagram of a multi-detector setup, where the PMTs are powered by a high voltage (HV) power 
supply. Detector anode output signals are fed to a digitizer, and packets of digitized pulses with time stamps are fed 
via USB link or optical link to a data acquisition system (DAQ). Pulses are processed on the DAQ using PSD to 
determine parameters such as neutron and gamma-ray photon count rates or PHDs or any other user desired 
information. 
 For all experiments mentioned in this dissertation, detector anode pulses were digitized 
with waveform digitizers from CAEN including the DT5720/V1720 and DT5730/V1730 where 
the “DT” models are portable desktop digitizers with fewer channels whereas “V” models will 
have more channels but are used in conjunction with a VME crate. Otherwise the specification of 
a DT5720 and V1720, for example, are identical [56]. Examples of these digitizers are pictured 




Fig. 2-9. CAEN V1730 (top) and DT5720 (bottom) digitizers. 
 
 The sampling rates for these digitizers are either 250 MHz (DT5720/V1720) or 500 MHz, 
which means that every 4 ns or every 2 ns the local pulse height of the pulse in time is sampled. 
These digitizers have either 12-bit (212 = 4096 voltage bins) or 14-bit (214 = 16384 voltage 
bins) vertical resolution. Given a digitizer 2 V dynamic range, all non-clipped measured pulses 
will therefore theoretically have pulse heights between 0 V and 2 V. Due to the user set trigger 
threshold, and a user set offset for the baseline, the actual range of acceptable pulse heights will 
in reality be a bit more constricted.    
A variety of CAEN-provided and University of Michigan Detection for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Group (DNNG)-written data acquisition scripts were utilized in all 
experiments. These tools are used to initiate and execute data acquisition and to set a variety of 
important measurement parameters such as channels to trigger on, measurement time, trigger 
thresholds, baseline offsets, acquisition window length for pulses, trigger location within pulse, 
and several other parameters.  Whenever a detector anode signal pulse exceeds the user-set 
trigger threshold, any signal in the digitizer buffer is converted into waveforms. These 
waveforms are written to a file and data is transferred from the digitizer to the DAQ via USB 
cable or optical link. In high count rate measurements the measurement system is limited by the 
80 MB/s processing limit of the digitizer, as well as additional limitations such as data transfer 
rate via USB versus optical link and the hard drive writing speed of the DAQ. Whenever the 
digitizer buffer is full due to an overwhelmingly high acquisition rate, additional incoming data 
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will be lost leading to an underestimation of count rate [56]. However, in the vast majority of 
measurements in this dissertation count rates were well below any of these upper limits. 
2.3. 
3
He neutron proportional counters 
3
He proportional tubes have long been the neutron detector of choice not only in RPM 
systems, but also in a wide variety of safeguards and nuclear security equipment. This isotope of 
helium exhibits an incredibly high interaction cross-section for undergoing the thermal neutron 
capture reaction in equation (2-8): 
                       3𝐻𝑒 + 𝑛𝑡ℎ →  
3𝐻 +  1𝐻 + 764 𝑘𝑒𝑉, 𝜎 = 5330 𝑏,                                 (2-8) 
where the charged particles (proton and triton) share the Q of this reaction (764 keV) 
which has a cross-section 𝜎 for thermal neutron capture. This cross-section drops off rapidly 
with increasing neutron energy. SNM and other materials typically emit fast neutrons on the 
order of MeV, while the capture reaction is most efficient for thermal neutrons. Therefore 
3
He 
proportional tubes are usually embedded in a hydrogenous moderator, such as HDPE, which 
thermalizes the incident neutron flux. 
Proportional counters have been around since the 1940s. An anode wire runs through the 
cylindrical tube containing the fill gas (
3
He). HV is applied to the anode wire to create an electric 
field. The protons and tritons resulting from the thermal neutron captures will ionize the fill gas 
thus creating electron-ion pairs. If the applied bias is high enough, recombination of these pairs 
will be suppressed. The electric field will result in migration of the electrons to the anode wire 
and ions to the cathode tube wall. The accelerated electrons will liberate secondary electrons in 
subsequent collisions with neutral gas atoms. If the applied electric field is chosen carefully, 
these secondary ionizations will lead to an avalanche of subsequent secondary ionizations. This 
gas multiplication process is known as a Townsend avalanche. Because the electric field rapidly 
decreases with distance from the anode wire, nearly all multiplication will occur within very 
close proximity to the anode wire. While the electrons will be quickly collected at the anode 
wire, the vast majority of the signal pulse is made up of the slow drift of the ions to the far away 
cathode wall. In a certain applied voltage region, the avalanche signal will be proportional to the 
energy deposited, thus the name proportional counter. Within a voltage region, known as the 
plateau, the measured count rate for a given neutron source should be independent of any applied 
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voltage fluctuations. For each thermal neutron detected, one expects the same amount of energy 
to be deposited, so the neutron count rate should be proportional to energy deposited in the tube. 
In reality, the range of the triton and proton are large relative to the tube dimensions. For capture 
reactions taking place near the tube walls, the proton or triton might escape the tube, thus leading 
to incomplete energy deposition and a feature known as the wall effect. The efficiency of the 
detector will vary with fill pressure of the gas, typically between two and ten atmospheres 
[42,57]. 
Every pulse in a 
3
He proportional counter is typically fed into a module containing a 
charge sensitive pre-amplifier followed by an amplifier, wave shaping and discriminator circuits. 
This means that the output of the tube is simply a TTL logic pulse for each incident pulse over 
threshold. The TTL outputs of multiple tubes can be daisy-chained together to give a summed 
output. Gamma insensitivity is another important attribute for these detectors. With no threshold 
applied, 
3
He will register a pulse for approximately 1 in 10,000 incident gamma-ray photons. 
However, by implementing a small detection threshold, the gamma-ray rejection rate, i.e. the rate 
at which gamma-ray photons are falsely registered as neutrons, can be lowered to 10−8 [23]   
Because 
3
He is the gold standard that we are trying to replace due to the reasons 
explained in Chapter 1, it is important to benchmark all new RPM developments to 
3
He 
performance. Therefore many measurements were also performed with the 
3
He RPM system 
shown in Figure 2-10. This system consists of three 3.92 atm GE-Reuter-Stokes model RSP4-
1659-202 
3
He proportional tubes. These tubes have a 5.08 cm diameter and are 152.4 cm long. 
The neutron pulse monitoring modules containing the amplifier and discriminator logic circuits 
are Precision Data Technology models PDT 10A and PDT 20A-HN. The 20A-HN has its own 
internal HV power supply for the proportional tube anode wire, while the 10A neutron pulse 
monitoring module does not. For tubes with the 10A model module, external HV bias was 
supplied with a CAEN model N472 HV power supply. The neutron pulse monitoring modules 
are powered by +12V provided by an Agilent Technologies model E3641A low power supply. 





Fig. 2-10. Opened 
3
He RPM containing three 
3








Chapter 3                                                                                    
Modeling and Designing RPMs with MCNPX-PoliMi and Benchtop 
Experiments 
 
 Several RPM prototypes were tested, and the results of those measurements are presented 
in Chapter 4. First, however, the RPM prototypes had to be designed and tested. This chapter 
focuses on three key design steps. First, particle transport codes were used to study a variety of 
design criteria and parameters in simulation space. This offers an inexpensive pathway to explore 
a wide variety of design ideas before committing to any particular hardware. Second, scaled 
down experiments with single detectors were used to confirm simulation findings, and establish 
basic system performance criteria like false alarm rates and minimum detectable activity through 
receiver operating characteristics curve analysis. Third, radiation detectors, occupancy sensors, 
data acquisition, and software had to all be integrated into a complete RPM system.  
3.1. Modeling RPMs with MCNPX-PoliMi 
3.1.1. The Particle Transport Code MCNPX-PoliMi 
 Simulation tools are a valuable commodity when developing a radiation detection system, 
such as an RPM. In particle transport codes, the user defines a radiation detection system, its 
surrounding environment, and the radiation source. The particle transport code then simulates a 
user-defined number of radiation source emissions, and tracks how each source particle travels 
though and interacts with the user defined environment. A random number generator and 
probabilities from cross-section libraries are used to create a random history for each source 
particle.  
For example, one might simulate a 
137
Cs gamma-ray photon point source, an organic 
liquid scintillation detector placed some distance from the radiation source, and environment, 
such as the walls and floors of the room of this experiment. Each source history begins with the 
creation of an isotropically-emitted 662 keV gamma-ray photon at the radiation point source 
location. Random numbers and interaction cross-sections for the materials in the environment 
would determine how this photon travels through and interacts with the environment. 
Interactions might lead to changes in energy, direction, and momentum of the photon. 
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Interactions might lead to the creation of additional particles, which are also tracked. In the end, 
every particle is either absorbed somewhere in the environment or escapes the user-defined 
geometry.  
The goal of these simulations for RPM design is to simulate the detector response to a 
variety of radiation sources. Simulations allow the user to quickly experiment with a wide range 
of radiation sources, detector types and configurations, and experimental environments at a 
fraction of the time and cost that would be required to perform with actual physical experiments. 
The RPM will have several required design parameter limitations, such as a minimum detection 
efficiency, or size/weight/cost constraints. One can thus simulate infinite design configurations 
to whittle down the selection to a handful of configurations with the most promising simulation 
results. 
 The particle transport code MCNPX-PoliMi was used for all simulations [58]. MCNPX-
PoliMi samples cross-section libraries, like ENDF-VII, to simulate the movement and 
interactions of gamma-ray photons and neutrons through a user-created environment as a 
function of particle energy and momentum. This particular code has several benefits over other 
particle transport codes, including built-in spontaneous fission and (alpha,n) sources. MCNPX-
PoliMi can produce a collision data output file for user-specified cells, such as the radiation 
detector material cells. The collision data file is useful for simulating detector response as it 
stores information for all neutron and photon interactions in the chosen cells. Stored information 
includes a total of 16 parameters, such as the particle type, the interaction type, the target 
nucleus, the time and location of the interaction, and the energy deposited, among others. 
 As explained in section 2.2, the scintillation light produced due to radiation interactions 
in an organic scintillation detector depends upon the incident particle type, the target nucleus, 
and the energy deposited. All of this information is included in the MCNPX-PoliMi collision 
output file. The MCNPX-PoliMi Post-Processing script, MPPost, has been developed and 
maintained by DNNG [59]. MPPost reads in the MCNPX-PoliMi collision data files. Light 
output is calculated as a function of energy deposited using relationships specified by the user in 
an input file. The total light output for all energy deposited for one history occurring within the 
scintillator’s pulse generation time is used to recreate an individual pulse. Processing the entire 
collision output file will result in thousands of pulses. MPPost outputs pulse height distributions 
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separated by particle type. The simulated number of source particles and the desired hypothetical 
source activity can be used to determine the simulated measurement time. The simulated 
measurement time and summed pulse height distributions yield simulated neutron and gamma-
ray photon count rates for the simulated RPM for the simulated radiation source scenario. 
3.1.2. Modeling Light Output for Organic Scintillators 
As already explained in section 2.2., a one-to-one relation exists between energy 
deposited by gamma-ray photons and light output in organic scintillation detectors when using 
electron-equivalent light output units. The light output produced as the result of neutron 
interactions in organic scintillators, however, is non-linear and exhibits significantly less than a 
one-to-one ratio. The light output for neutron collisions on carbon is very small for several 
reasons. From equation (2-5), it can be shown that the recoil carbon nucleus can at maximum 
only receive 28% of the incident neutron energy, whereas hydrogen recoil nuclei can receive up 
to 100% of the incident neutron energy. Additionally, due to the lower velocity of carbon recoil 
nuclei as well as their higher stopping power relative to lighter hydrogen recoil nuclei (see 
equation 2-6), neutron scattering on carbon should result in relatively low light output. Low light 
output for carbon scattering, often below the user-set energy threshold, has also been shown in 
measurements [60] . For MPPost light output conversions, it was assumed that carbon recoil 
nuclei resulted in light output equivalent to two percent of the energy deposited by the incident 
neutron [60]. 
Determining the light output response neutron collisions on hydrogen in organic 
scintillators often requires time-of-flight measurements, such as those described in [61]. 
Different neutron time-of-flight slices correspond to different incident neutron energies that can 
be computed from the known neutron flight path and flight time. For every incident neutron 
energy, the neutron can deposit from zero up to all of its energy in a collision with a hydrogen 
nucleus. Taking into account energy resolution broadening effects, one can use the upper limits 
of the pulse height distributions formed by these quasi-monoenergetic neutron interactions on 
hydrogen to build a dataset of neutron light output response. These data will vary with detector 
type and shape, and due to statistical and measurement limitations, these response data will often 
not cover the full neutron energy range of interest. Choosing the fitted and extrapolated neutron 
light output response curve therefore plays a crucial role in the degree to which simulated and 
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measured organic scintillator neutron pulse height distributions will agree. Exponential fits, as 
well as those suggested by Birks and Voltz are commonly used, and are shown in equation (3-1) 
through (3-3) [62,63]: 
                         𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙: 𝐿(𝐸) = 𝑎𝐸 − 𝑏[1 − 𝑐 ∗ exp(−𝐸𝑑)],                            (3-1) 






𝑑𝐸,                                                  (3-2) 
                            𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑧: 𝐿(𝐸) = 𝑎 ∫ [(1 − 𝑐) exp [−
𝑏(1−𝑐)𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑥
] + 𝑐] 𝑑𝐸,                      (3-3) 
where 𝐿(𝐸) is the light output produced by the organic scintillator for neutrons depositing energy 
𝐸 in the detector through interactions on hydrogen. Coefficients 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 are determined 
through fitting the above functional forms to the measured neutron response data. For detectors 
discussed in this dissertation, Birks and Voltz were found to produce the best agreement to 
measured data [49].   
3.1.3. Modeling Moving Sources with MCNPX-PoliMi 
Radiation sources in MCNPX-PoliMi can be simple mono-energetic point sources, like a 
137
Cs calibration source, or complex volumetric sources with many different emissions, like a 
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel canister. Regardless of the complexity of the source, the source 
position remains fixed throughout a MCNPX-PoliMi simulation. In order to fully simulate a 
realistic RPM measurement, however, it was important to capture the effects of a moving 
radiation source. 
All sources tested in the laboratory and during benchmark experiments were small 
enough or far enough away from the RPM as to be treated as point sources. Assuming that the 
source would be moving at a constant speed past the RPM, the source could be represented as a 
line source for which radiation emissions are equally probable along the entire length of the line. 
One important parameter to be determined through simulations was an optimum measurement 
time for the RPM, i.e. as a pedestrian or vehicle approaches the RPM, when does one start and 
end the data acquisition. When screening a pedestrian one can assume the radiation background 
to be relatively constant. For much larger screening objects, like cargo containers, the ship effect 
may increase neutron background, while the terrestrial gamma-ray photon background will be 
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suppressed due to the cargo container’s shielding effect [26]. Assuming constant background, 
there should be a diminishing signal to background return the further the source is away from the 
RPM.  
For example, an RPM consisting of eight 7.62 cm diameter EJ309 liquid organic 
scintillators was modeled in MCPX-PoliMi, as shown in Figure 3-1.  The length of the line 
source corresponds to the RPM measurement time assuming a user-defined source transit speed 
of 1.2 m/s for pedestrians [38]. For a given source strength, one can obtain a simulated RPM  
radiation count rate for different measurement times of a moving radiation source.  
For a simulated 0.59 MBq 
137
Cs source traveling at 1.2 m/s, Figure 3-2a shows the 
diminishing returns of increasing the RPM measurement time beyond 3 s, an ideal RPM 
measurement time found through other analysis methods as well [64]. As it would be impractical 
to develop a system in our laboratory to move radioactive sources at a constant speed parallel to 
the RPM, it was also desirable to determine a static measurement equivalent time to a three 
second dynamic measurement time.  Figure 3-2b overlays RPM count rates as a function of static 
and dynamic source measurement times. One can see that for a three second dynamic source 
measurement an equivalent number of counts are recorded in the RPM for a two second static 
measurement of the same radioactive source.   
 
 
Fig. 3-1. (a) Side and (b) front view of an eight 7.62 cm diameter EJ309 cylindrical liquid scintillator RPM 
modeled in MCNPX-PoliMi and later built as a prototype (c). A 0.59 MBq 
137
Cs line source is situated 75 cm 
parallel to RPM front face. The source is assumed to be moving at 1.2 m/s, and the length of the line source 






Fig. 3-2. (a) Simulated RPM gamma-ray photon count rates for setup from Figure 3-1 for a range of 
different measurement times simulated via changing the length of the line source. (b) Comparison count rates of a 
static (red) versus a dynamic (blue) source measurement to establish that a 3 s measurement for a source moving at 
1.2 m/s can be reproduced in the laboratory with a 2 s static source measurement [65]. 
 
The type, shape, and number of detectors used in our RPM prototypes was determined 
through the use of receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves, as explained further in 
Chapter 3.2. However, MCNPX-PoliMi simulations were also used to optimize the layout of the 
detectors in rows and columns, and the spacing between detectors. Differences in efficiency for 
the different layouts simulated were, in the end, relatively small, but these simulation results 
were used, for instance, to choose the two row and four column layout for the pedestrian RPM 
shown in Figure 3-1.    
3.2. Establishing System False Alarm Rate and Minimum Detectable Activity 
Using Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves 
3.2.1. What are Receiver Operating Characteristics Curves? 
 An ideal RPM would exhibit high absolute detection efficiency at low total detector and 
system cost. The size, type, and number of detectors dictates cost, but the detector with the 
highest intrinsic efficiency might not be the ideal RPM detector if it is costly and many are 
needed to achieve the desired absolute system efficiency. When comparing different RPM 
systems, two interlaced parameters are of great importance. On the one hand, the RPM should 




















should exhibit a very low false alarm rate on natural background. As neutron nuisance alarms are 
exceedingly rare and any neutron RPM neutron alarm is treated very seriously, a very low 
neutron false alarm rate is particularly important. 
 Focusing on the example of neutron background and some MDA neutron source, one can 
represent the RPM neutron detection response to this source as two overlapping Poisson 
distributions, as shown in Figure 3-3. The user defines some neutron count rate as an alarm 
threshold, 𝑡𝑛, that should result in a very low false alarm rate, i.e. minimizes the area of the 
background neutron Poisson distribution that falls to the right of 𝑡𝑛. At the same time it is 
imperative that the probability of neutron alarming on the MDA source is high, i.e. minimize the 
area of MDA neutron source Poisson distribution that is to the left of 𝑡𝑛. Selecting an appropriate 
𝑡𝑛 is trivial if the background and MDA Poisson distributions are well separated, but much more 
challenging when they are overlapping, as they are in Figure 3-3.  
 
Fig. 3-3. Example of the probability of an RPM detecting N neutrons per second from a background and some MDA 
neutron Poisson distributions. For a user defined alarm threshold neutron count rate, 𝑡𝑛,the true negative rate, 𝑇𝑁, is 
the probability of correctly not neutron alarming on neutron background, whereas the false negative rate, 𝐹𝑁, is the 
probability of not alarming on the MDA neutron source. The false positive rate, 𝐹𝑃, the false alarm rate probability 




 The false alarm probability, 𝑃𝐹𝑃, and true alarm probability, 𝑃𝑇𝑃, can be calculated using 
equations (3-4) and (3-5), where 𝜇𝐵𝐺 and 𝜇𝑆𝐼𝐺 are means of background and MDA neutron 
Poisson distributions: 







,                                       (3-4) 







                                       (3-5) 
An ROC curve, like the one shown in Figure 3-4, can be obtained by computing 𝑃𝐹𝑃 and 𝑃𝑇𝑃 
over a range of different alarm thresholds, 𝑡𝑛, and then plotting these two probabilities against 
each other. Looking at the ROC curve for an RPM allows one to find the desired false alarm 
probability, 𝑃𝐹𝑃, and see if the corresponding true alarm probability, 𝑃𝑇𝑃, for the MDA source is 
acceptable. This allows for an easy comparison between may different RPM systems.    
 
Fig. 3-4. Example of an ROC curve for the sample background and MDA source neutron Poisson distributions from 
Figure 3-3 [49]. 
3.2.2. Experimental Setup for Comparing Different Detectors for RPM Suitability 
 The three differently-shaped and sized liquid organic scintillation detectors from Table 2-
1 and Figure 2-7 were compared amongst themselves and against the 
3
He RPM described in 
section 2.3 using ROC analysis for a moderated 
252
Cf source MDA scenario [49,66]. The setups, 
shown in Figure 3-5, included a 110,000 n/s 
252
Cf source placed 100 cm from the detector front 
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face and shielded by a 10 cm thick HDPE slab. A 50-keVee light output threshold was applied to 
all organic liquid scintillators, corresponding to a neutron energy of approximately 470 keV. All 
three organic scintillators were gain matched by aligning the 
137
Cs 478-keV Compton edge at a 
pulse height of 1.6 V using the CAEN DT5720 digitizer which features a 2 V dynamic range. 
This relatively high gain was intentionally chosen to preserve the ability of the RPM to detect 
low energy gamma-ray photon sources, such as 
241
Am (60 keV gamma-ray photon) and 
57
Co 
(122 keV gamma-ray photon). Using the PSD curves described in [49,66] and measurement 
times varying between 10 and 90 minutes, neutron count rates were obtained for all four 
detection setups pictured in Figure 3-5.  
 
Fig. 3-5. (a) 
3
He RPM, (b) 7.62 cm  ∅ cylindrical EJ309, (c) 12.7 cm  ∅ cylindrical EJ309, and (d) 25 cm x 25 cm x 
10 cm BC501A; 110,000 n/s 
252
Cf + 10 cm HDPE at 100 cm from detector front face [49]. 
3.2.3. Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve Results for Comparing Different 
Organic Liquid Scintillation Detector Shapes and Volumes 
 Table 3-1 lists the measured neutron count rates observed from background and the 
setups shown in Figure 3-5, as well as simulated neutron count rates obtained from MCNPX-
PoliMi simulations of the same measurements. Measured and simulated neutron count rates 
agree well with the exception of the 25x25x10 cm
3
 BC501A paddle. The measured and 
simulated PHDs for that detector are shown Figure 3-6. The fractional difference plot between 
measurement and simulation, shown in Figure 3-7, shows that measurement and simulation agree 
within ten to fifteen percent at light output over 250 keVee or 1.5 MeV neutron energy. The 
discrepancy of measured and simulated count rate for this largest volume detector thus arises 
from the lower pulse height region where overlapping of the neutron and gamma-ray photon 
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bands required a conservative PSD curve at the cost of low neutron energy detection efficiency 
[49]. A material with better PSD characteristics would allow one to operate at low thresholds 
without sacrificing neutron efficiency at lower energies [43,51,67]. 
Table 3-1. Measured and simulated neutron count rates for moderated 
252
Cf setup shown in Figure 3-5 [49,66]. 
Neutron Count Rate Detector 
3
He RPM 
7.62 cm ∅ 
EJ309 




Measured Background [n/s] 3.13 ± 0.02 0.24 ± 0.01 0.25 ± 0.01 2.60 ± 0.07 
Measured [n/s] 373.3 ± 0.5 6.0 ± 0.1 17.6 ± 0.1 26.5 ± 0.2 
Simulated [n/s], 100 cm 415.2 ± 2.6 6.1 ± 0.3 17.7 ± 0.2 82.2 ± 0.3 
 
 
Fig. 3-6. Measured and MCNPX-PoliMi simulated neutron pulse height distributions for moderated 
252
Cf 




Fig. 3-7. Fractional difference plot for measured and simulated PHDs from figure 3-6, showing 10-15 percent 
agreement between measurement and simulation at light output over 300 keVee[49]. 
 These measured neutron count rates were then scaled to a 20,000 n/s source strength to 
make the MDA scenario more challenging. The total counts for a two second measurement, 
equivalent to a three second dynamic measurement (see section 3.1.3.), was then used in 
equations (3-4) an (3-5) as 𝜇𝑆𝐼𝐺, and the measured background count rates were modified 
accordingly to be used as 𝜇𝐵𝐺 in the same equations. For this given MDA scenario and a desired 
false alarm rate of 1 in 10,000 [38,39] one can now create ROC curves to compare the four 
different detectors, as show in Figure 3-8. The 
3
He RPM excels at this MDA scenario, while 
none of the single liquid organic scintillation detectors come close to the desired 100% true 
positive alarm probability. Increasing the size of the liquid detector from the 7.62 cm diameter 
EJ309 to the 12.7 cm diameter EJ309 exhibits a steep improvement in the ROC curve, but not 
much is gained from the increased volume of the 25x25x10 cm
3
 BC501A due to the loss of 
neutron efficiency at lower energies because of the conservative PSD curve.  
In terms of developing an RPM, one can easily scale this ROC analysis to determine how 
many of any given detector are needed to achieve a 100% true positive alarm probability for this 
MDA scenario while also not exceeding the desired 1 in 10,000 false alarm rate. ROC curves for 
different numbers of 7.62 cm diameter and 12.7 cm diameter EJ309 organic liquid scintillation 
detectors are shown in Figures 3-9 and 3-10. Data for a wide variety of different RPM 
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configuration scenarios are also summarized in Table 3-2. The ROC curve analysis suggests that 
this particular MDA neutron source scenario could therefore be satisfactorily detected with a 1 in 
10,000 false alarm rate by using either eight 7.62 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic 
liquid scintillation detectors, two 12.7 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid 
scintillation detectors, or three 25x25x10 cm
3
 paddle-shaped BC501 organic scintillation 
detectors. As later described in Section 4.2, the pedestrian RPM using eight 7.62 cm diameter 
cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detectors did indeed exhibit satisfactory 
neutron alarming performance for a very similar MDA neutron source test scenario. 
 
 
Fig. 3-8. ROC curve comparison of three different organic liquid scintillators and a 
3
He RPM for the moderated 
252
Cf setup from Figure 3-5 [49]. A 1 in 10,000 desired neutron false alarm rate is indicated by the dashed vertical 




Fig. 3-9. ROC curve comparison of different number of 7.62 cm diameter EJ309 cylindrical active volume organic 
scintillation detectors for the moderated 
252
Cf setup from Figure 3-5b [49]. A 1 in 10,000 desired neutron false alarm 
rate is indicated by the dashed vertical black line [38]. 
 
 
Fig. 3-10. ROC curve comparison of different number of 12.7 cm diameter EJ309 cylindrical active volume organic 
scintillation detectors for the moderated 
252
Cf setup from Figure 3-5c [49]. A 1 in 10,000 desired neutron false alarm 
rate is indicated by the dashed vertical black line [38]. 
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Table 3-2. Probabilities of a true alarm as a function of number of detectors and assuming a 1 in 10,000 false alarm 
rate for a 2 s measurement of a 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf source placed 100 cm from the detector front face and shielded by 
10 cm of HDPE, as show in the setups in Figure 3-5 [49]. 
Detector PTA 
 3He RPM (3 tubes) 1 
One 25x25x10 cm3 BC501A 0.56 
Two 25x25x10 cm3 BC501A 0.91 
Three 25x25x10 cm3 BC501A 0.99 
One 12.7 cm ∅ EJ309 0.56 
Two 12.7 cm ∅ EJ309 0.99 
Three 12.7 cm ∅ EJ309 1 
One 7.62 cm ∅ EJ309 0.03 
Four 7.62 cm ∅ EJ309 0.71 
Eight 7.62 cm ∅ EJ309 0.96 
 
 
3.3. Designing a Complete RPM System Architecture 
 Two RPM systems were designed and tested extensively in benchmark campaigns 
discussed in Chapter 4. The pedestrian RPM, depicted in Figure 3-11a, consisted of eight 7.62 
cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detectors and used a CAEN 
V1720 digitizer board. The vehicle RPM, depicted in Figure 3-11b, consisted of four 12.7 cm 
diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detectors and one 25x25x10 cm
3
 
paddle-shaped BC501 organic scintillation detector. Based upon measurements and simulations, 
ideally the vehicle RPM would have contained two or more 25x25x10 cm
3
 paddle-shaped 
BC501 organic scintillation detectors, but due to planning and logistics constraints, the 12.7 cm 
diameter EJ309 liquids were used as an adequate substitute. The vehicle RPM used a CAEN 




Fig. 3-11. (a) Pedestrian RPM consisting of eight 7.62 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid 
scintillation detectors; (b) vehicle RPM consisting of four 12.7 cm diameter EJ309 cylindrical active volume organic 
scintillation detectors and one 25x25x10 cm
3
 BC501A liquid detector. Both RPMs used two web-cameras and 
motion detection software as a makeshift occupancy sensor [40,41]. 
 In order to trigger a measurement, a makeshift occupancy sensor had to be constructed. 
Two USB commercial web-cameras pointing in opposite directions were used in conjunction 
with motion detection freeware [68]. Assuming a constant source-transit speed, such as 1.2 m/s 
for the pedestrian RPM, and assuming a three second measurement time, we measured out the 
distances to the left and right of the RPM at which we wished to trigger the three second data 
acquisition. The motion detection software uses a mask for which the user defines the region of 
the image in which any image change, i.e. motion, triggers a motion detection event. An example 
of a mask and an image taken at the time of a motion trigger event are shown in Figure 3-12. A 
low resolution trigger picture was saved for each trigger for debugging purposes, and to filter out 
any unintended trigger events. 
 Any time motion is detected a three second data acquisition is triggered. A modified near 
real-time data acquisition and processing software was used. This script was originally 
developed by Alexis Poitrasson-Riviere for the DNNG Dual Particle Imager [69,70]. Acquired 
pulses are passed from the digitizer buffer to the DAQ in packets which then have PSD applied 
to them to build up gamma-ray photon and neutron count rates as well as PHDs. Within a few 
seconds of the RPM measurement finishing, a standardized XML file containing relevant 
measurement data is created. The XML file contains information on what type of alarm was 




gamma-ray and photon count rates and, in the case of a gamma alarm, what radionuclide was 
identified.    
 
Fig. 3-12. (a) Example of a trigger picture captured by the vehicle RPM occupancy sensor [40]. (b) The motion 
detection software [68] will signal that motion has been detected if the image in the white portion of this mask 
changes. Separate masks are used to detect motion approaching from the left and right of the RPM.  











Chapter 4                                                                                        
Testing RPM Prototypes Under Real-World Conditions 
 
 The two RPM prototypes described Chapter 3 needed to be rigorously tested with a 
variety of moving gamma-ray photon and neutron sources, including SNM. The majority of data 
was collected in two extended measurements trips to an RPM testing facility in Italy in 2014. 
4.1. The European Commission SCINTILLA RPM Testbed Facility 
 
 Testing conditions and scenarios for RPMs are outlined in the ANSI standard N42.35 
[38] and IAEA-TECDOC-1312 [71]. A number of RPM testbeds with appropriate facilities and 
nuclear and radiological reference sources have been developed around the world. We were 
granted access to the European Commission’s RPM testbed at the JRC in Ispra, Italy. Data were 
collected with the pedestrian RPM (see Chapter 3.3) for two weeks in February 2014 and with 
the vehicle RPM (see Chapter 3.3) for two weeks in November 2014. 
 The JRC RPM testbed is an indoor facility consisting of an electric rail-cart system. 
Sources are placed in an adjustable source holder with a 2.1 m maximum source height. The 
maximum possible source transit speed is 3 m/s, though the ANSI standard only calls for 1.2 m/s 
for pedestrian RPMs and 2.2 m/s for vehicle RPMs. Sources can be shielded with a variety of 
common shield materials, like lead, steel, and HDPE. The facility has been used for a variety of 




 of three RPM 
benchmark campaigns that were part of the European Commission’s SCINTILLA project which 
was launched in 2012 to develop and test new technologies for detecting nuclear and radiological 
materials. The SCINTILLA component relevant to us focused on the development and testing of 
3
He-free RPM systems [73]. The facility is shown in Figure 4-1. 
 Other invited participants at SCINTILLA included representatives from the French 
Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), SAPHYMO, Istituto Nazionale di 
Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Ansaldo Nucleare, symetrica, Arktis Radiation Detectors and others. 
Detector materials used by these institutions included PSD capable plastic organic scintillators 
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[74], gadolinium capture-gated plastic scintillators [75], and 
6
LiZnS(Ag) [76]. All laboratories 
and companies provided their own 
3
He-free systems for testing. During official benchmark 
measurements, all RPMs were operated by JRC staff and modifications or interventions by the 
RPM designers were prohibited.  
 
Fig. 4-1. RPM testing facility at European Commission JRC Ispra, Italy. Left: 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark campaign 
in February 2014. Right: Electric rail cart system. (Photo credit: JRC Ispra). 
  
252
Cf was used as a source of spontaneous fission neutrons for all neutron alarm tests. 
Most tests were performed with ANSI recommended 20,000 n/s activity 
252
Cf sources [38], 
though tests also included weaker sources with activities of 7,000, 10,000, and 13,000 n/s. All 




 The ANSI RPM standards lists a number of recommended gamma-ray photon emitting 
radionuclides and activities with which to test RPM gamma-ray alarm sensitivities. Table 4-1  
shows that all sources used at the two SCINTILLA benchmarks were of approximately the 
recommended activity. No 
232
Th source was available for testing, even though it is an ANSI 
recommended source. A number of medical isotopes were originally planned to be part of the 
SCINTILLA benchmarks, but had to be left out due to issues with the JRC cyclotron. A host of 














Tl were measured in June 2016 




Table 4-1. Gamma-ray photon source activities for ANSI recommended sources as well as activities used at 
the two SCINTILLA RPM benchmark experiments at the JRC Ispra in February and November 2014.  
Source Source Activity 
[kBq] (ANSI) [38] 
Source Activity [kBq] (2
nd
 
SCINTILLA, pedestrian RPM) [39] 
Source Activity [kBq] (3
rd
 
SCINTILLA, vehicle RPM) [40,77] 
57
Co 185 204 262 
133
Ba 518 301 212 
137
Cs 592 370 350 
60
Co 259 259 181 
232
Th 517 NA NA 
241
Am 1740 2220 2200 
    
HEU NA 51 g; 89.9 % 
235
U NA 
WGPu NA 6.6 g; 93% 
239





4.2. RPM False Alarm Tests 
 False alarms are defined as radiation alarms in the presence of no external radiation 
source except natural background radiation. Unless the neutron and gamma-ray photon alarm 
threshold are set incredibly high, there always exists some non-zero probability of fluctuations in 
background radiation resulting in a false alarm. The ANSI RPM standards require a 1 in 10,000 
false alarm rate. This means that in 10,000 occupancies the RPM should register no more than 
one false alarm. In practice, an even lower false alarm rate is highly desirable. To test RPM false 
alarm rates at SCINTILLA, the electric cart was run for thousands occupancy passages overnight 
with no radiation sources placed on the cart. Alarm rates were set at five standard deviations 
above mean background. For the pedestrian RPM the alarm threshold settings were 8 neutrons 
and/or 3,856 gamma-ray photons measured in three seconds [39]. For the vehicle RPM the alarm 
threshold settings were 14 neutrons and 11,044 gamma-ray photons. For the pedestrian RPM at 
the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark our RPM recorded zero false alarms in the 2,739 overnight RPM 
occupancies. For the vehicle RPM at the 3
rd
 SCINTILLA benchmark our RPM recorded zero 
false alarms in 1,781 overnight RPM occupancies. While the lack of false alarms is encouraging 
in these data, a larger dataset would have been preferable given more time. Histograms of the 




Fig. 4-2.Histograms of measured (a) neutrons and (b) gamma-ray photons in 2,739 three second measurements for 
the false alarm test for the pedestrian RPM during the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark in February 2014 at the European 
Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy. The alarm thresholds shown are set five standard deviations above the mean 
background count rates. 
4.3. RPM Neutron Alarm Tests 
4.3.1. Pedestrian RPM Neutron Alarm Results 
 ANSI standards [38] for pedestrian RPMs require the RPM to alarm at least 59 out of 60 
times  on a 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf moving at 1.2 m/s (2.7 miles per hour, 4.3 kilometers per hour)  at a 
source to single pillar RPM distance of 1 m. The neutron source is to be placed at a 1.2 m source 
height. The same test is to be repeated with the neutron source shielded with 4 cm thick HDPE 
moderator. The test is also to be repeated at a range of source heights to test the RPM sensitivity 
to sources high off of or low to the ground. 
 Neutron alarm tests were included in the February 2014 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark. As 
the DNNG system is eventually intended as a two pillar system, a source to detector distance of 
70 cm was used. This reduced distance doubles the observed RPM radiation count rates based 
upon the one over distance squared dependence of the RPM solid angle relative to the radiation 
source. 
 Due to time constraints, most tests were only run for 30 repetitions as opposed to the 
prescribed 60 iterations. In order to go beyond the ANSI standards, several even more 
challenging scenarios were tested. These included elevated source speeds of 2.2 m/s and 3 m/s, a 
reduced source activity of 10,000 n/s, and an increased HDPE moderator thickness of 8 cm. 
Detailed neutron alarm test conditions and results are included in Table B-1 in Appendix B. A 
subset of these results are highlighted in Table 4-2. These results show that the pedestrian RPM 
met the basic ANSI standards. Many beyond ANSI standard tests were successfully passed as 
well, though the RPM struggled when multiple parameters went well beyond the ANSI standard, 
such as the combination of a halved source activity, doubled HDPE shielding, and elevated 
source transit speed. 
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Table 4-2. Highlights of February 2014 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark pedestrian RPM neutron alarm test 
results [39,41] for ANSI [38] and beyond ANSI standard test conditions using a 10,000 n/s or 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf 
source with 1 cm steel and 0.5 cm lead shielding. Underlined values indicate parameters set at beyond ANSI 
standard for pedestrian RPM. Full neutron alarm dataset may be found in Table B-1 in Appendix B.  













20,000 1.2 0 1.2 63 30/30 
20,000 1.2 4 1.2 24 30/30 
Beyond ANSI Standard Tests 
20,000 2.2 0 1.2 30 30/30 
20,000 3 0 1.2 23 30/30 
20,000 2.2 0 1.9 22 60/60 
20,000 2.2 0 2.1 20 30/30 
10,000 1.2 0 1.2 23 30/30 
10,000 2.2 0 1.2 15 28/30 
20,000 2.2 4 1.2 15 30/30 
10,000 1.2 4 1.2 9 17/30 
10,000 2.2 4 1.2 8 15/30 
20,000 1.2 8 1.2 14 29/30 
20,000 2.2 8 1.2 8 14/30 
10,000 1.2 8 1.2 6 5/30 
10,000 2.2 8 1.2 3 0/30 
 
 To visualize the test results, neutron counts per trial were extracted from the XML files, 
like the one in Figure A-1 in Appendix A, for the various neutron alarm test cases described in 
Table 4-2 and Table B-1 in Appendix B. Figure 4-3 shows the pedestrian RPM neutron count 
distribution shifting downwards when the source transit speed is increased from 1.2 m/s (4.3 
km/h) to 3 m/s (10.8 km/h). In both cases, however, the neutron count distribution remains well 





Fig. 4-3.     Histograms of measured neutrons for 30 three second measurements of an unshielded 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf 
moving at 1.2 m/s (red) or 3 m/s (blue). These histograms correspond to the data from folders 2 (red) and 3 (blue) in 
Table B-1 in Appendix B. These measurements were part of the pedestrian RPM neutron alarm testing during the 2
nd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark in February 2014 at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy [39,41]. The 9 neutrons 
alarm threshold shown is set five standard deviations above the mean background count rate. 
 The effects of adding increasing amounts of HDPE shielding around the 
252
Cf neutron 
source are shown in the histograms in Figure 4-4. The unshielded source results in neutron 
counts in the pedestrian RPM that are consistently well above the 9 neutron alarm threshold. The 
addition of 4 cm of HDPE shielding, however, shifts the neutron counts distribution to much 
lower neutron counts on average, thus even resulting in one undetected trial out of thirty trials. 
The addition of 8 cm of HDPE shielding moves the lower end of the neutron distribution to just 
above the 9 neutron alarm threshold. Keeping all other parameters constant, any further increase 
in the shielding thickness would undoubtedly detrimentally affect the ability of the pedestrian 




Fig. 4-4.     Histograms of measured neutrons for 30 three second measurements of a 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf moving at 1.2 
m/s past the pedestrian RPM. Histograms are shown for tests with different amounts of HDPE shielding around the 
neutron source: (a) unshielded, (b) 4 cm thick HDPE, and (c) 8 cm thick HDPE. These histograms correspond to the 
data from folders (a) 2, (b) 16, and (c) 10 in Table B-1 in Appendix B. These measurements were part of the 
pedestrian RPM neutron alarm testing during the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark in February 2014 at the European 
Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy [39,41]. The 9 neutrons alarm threshold shown is set five standard deviations above 
the mean background count rate. 
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 Finally, some test cases that went above and beyond the basic ANSI standards [38] give 
us an idea of the limitations of the current system. In Figure 4-5, three different test scenarios are 
depicted in which the pedestrian RPM failed to neutron alarm on the 
252
Cf source more than 50% 
of the time. All three of these cases involve 8 cm of HDPE source shielding, as well as a reduced 
source activity and/or an elevated source transit speed. Overall, nevertheless, the pedestrian RPM 





Fig. 4-5.     Histograms of measured neutrons for 30 three second measurements of a 
252
Cf source from the 
pedestrian RPM neutron alarm testing during the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark in February 2014 at the European 
Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy [39,41]. All three cases involve test scenarios well beyond ANSI standard neutron 
alarming test conditions [38] and a majority of runs resulted in neutron counts below the 9 neutrons alarm threshold 
which is set five standard deviations above the mean neutron background count rate. The three test cases shown are: 
(a) 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf with 8 cm HDPE shielding and moving at 2.2 m/s, (b) 10,000 n/s 
252
Cf with 8 cm HDPE 
shielding and moving at 1.2 m/s, and (c) 10,000 n/s 
252
Cf with 8 cm HDPE shielding and moving at 2.2 m/s. These 
histograms correspond to the data from folders (a) 9, (b) 12, and (c) 11 in Table B-1 in Appendix B. 
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4.3.2. Vehicle RPM Neutron Alarm Results 
 The ANSI standards for vehicle RPMs differ only in a few areas from those described 
already in 4.3.1 for pedestrian RPMs [38]. The source transit speed for vehicle RPM testing is 
prescribed to be 2.2 m/s, as opposed to the slower 1.2 m/s for pedestrian RPMs. The distance 
between vehicle RPM panels is set at 5 m. Our vehicle RPM consisted of a single panel at 2.5 m 
from the source rail track center. 
 Our vehicle RPM (see section 3.3 and Figure 3-11b) was tested during the 3
rd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy, in November 2014. 
Once again, due to time constraints most neutron alarm tests were run for fewer than the ANSI 
[38] recommended 60 trials. The 
252
Cf source activities used for these experiments were 7,000 
n/s, 13,000 n/s, and the ANSI [38] recommended 20,000 n/s. The source height used was 1.1 m 
instead of the usual 1.2 m. No 4 cm HDPE shielded neutron source tests were performed, as all 
participants agreed that their systems would easily pass this scenario. Therefore only iterations of 
the more challenging 8 cm HDPE shielded 
252
Cf were run. 
 The full set of neutron alarm test results for our vehicle RPM are presented in Table 4-3. 
The vehicle RPM passed all basic neutron alarm tests with perfect marks. Tests with the 
252
Cf at 
elevated heights of 2.1 m and 2.7 m posed no challenges. Performance for detecting the 
unshielded but weaker activity 7,000 n/s and 13,000 n/s 
252
Cf sources ranged from modest to 
good. Performance for the 8 cm HDPE shielded 
252
Cf trials, however, was poor, especially when 
using any of the lower activity neutron sources. Overall, the performance for neutron alarming 









Table 4-3. Results of November 2014 3
rd
 SCINTILLA benchmark vehicle RPM neutron alarm test results 
[40,77] for ANSI [38] and beyond ANSI standard test conditions using 7,000 n/s, 13,000 n/s, or 20,000 n/s 
252
Cf 
sources with 1 cm steel and 0.5 cm lead shielding. Underlined values indicate parameters set at beyond ANSI 








Height (m) Passages Alarms 
ANSI standard tests 
20,000 2.2 0 1.1 52 52 
20,000 1.2 0 1.1 32 32 
Beyond ANSI standard tests 
20,000 2.2 8 1.1 34 11 
20,000 1.2 8 1.1 32 21 
13,000 2.2 0 1.1 32 30 
13,000 1.2 0 1.1 31 31 
13,000 2.2 8 1.1 32 4 
13,000 1.2 8 1.1 30 17 
7,000 2.2 0 1.1 34 18 
20,000 2.2 0 2.1 32 32 
20,000 2.2 0 2.7 32 32 
 
4.4. RPM Gamma-Ray Photon Alarm Tests 
4.4.1. Pedestrian RPM Gamma-Ray Photon Alarm Results 
 This section concerns only the ability to alarm on the presence of the gamma-ray photon 
sources. The ability to identify radionuclides based upon gamma-ray photon measurements with 
the RPMs is discussed separately in Chapter 5. The testing conditions for  gamma-ray photon 
alarming are very similar to those already described for neutron alarm tests in section 4.3; a list 
of ANSI prescribed sources and source activities were listed previously in Table 4-1. All sources 
are to be detected in at least 59 out of 60 iterations with the source moving at 1.2 m/s at a source 
height of 1.2 m. A single pillar RPM is to be placed 1 m from the source track [38]. 
 Gamma-ray photon alarm tests were performed with the pedestrian RPM at the 2
nd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy, in February 2014 
[39,41]. The gamma-ray photon sources and source activities used are listed in Table 4-1 and 
differ from the ANSI required source activities. Most gamma-ray photon sources used are of 
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lower activity, thus making the tests more challenging. The one exception is 
241
Am, for which a 
higher than prescribed activity source was used. Additionally, two SNM sources were included 
in the gamma-ray photon alarm tests. These were a 6.6 g WGPu plutonium-oxide sample (93% 
239
Pu), as well as a 51 g HEU (89.9 % 
235
U) sample. Due to time constraints, typically only 30 
trials were run per source scenario rather than the ANSI prescribed 60 trials. Up to 3 cm of steel 
source shielding was included in some measurements. The full list of test scenarios and 
pedestrian RPM results are listed in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4. Results of February 2014 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark pedestrian RPM gamma-ray photon alarm 
test results [40,77] for ANSI [38] and beyond ANSI standard test conditions using a variety of gamma-ray photon 
















Co 204 1.2 1.2 0 4021 29/30 
57
Co 204 2.2 1.2 0 3867 15/30 
133
Ba 110 1.2 1.2 0 4004 30/30 
133
Ba 110 2.2 1.2 0 3877 22/30 
133
Ba 301 1.2 1.2 0 4808 30/30 
133
Ba 301 1.2 2.0 0 4239 30/30 
133
Ba 301 2.2 1.2 0 4432 30/30 
133
Ba 301 2.2 2.5 0 3945 28/30 
137
Cs 370 1.2 1.2 0 4635 30/30 
137
Cs 370 2.2 1.2 0 4298 30/30 
137
Cs 3700 1.2 1.9 3 5648 30/30 
137
Cs 3700 2.2 2.1 3 4839 30/30 
60
Co 259 1.2 1.2 0 4572 30/30 
60
Co 259 2.2 1.2 0 4277 30/30 
60
Co 259 1.2 2.0 0 4212 30/30 
60
Co 259 2.2 2.5 0 3944 29/30 
241
Am 2220 1.2 1.2 0 4025 30/30 
241
Am 2220 2.2 1.2 0 3864 18/30 
HEU 51 g 1.2 1.2 0 4502 30/30 
HEU 51 g 2.2 1.2 0 4223 30/30 
WGPu 6.6 g 1.2 1.2 0 5381 30/30 
WGPu 6.6 g 2.2 1.2 0 4757 30/30 
WGPu 6.6 g 1.2 1.2 1 4546 30/30 
WGPu 6.6 g 2.2 1.2 1 4215 30/30 
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 Overall the pedestrian RPM performed very well. Nearly all test scenarios resulted in 
perfect detection rates. Figure 4-6a shows that the pedestrian RPM can easily detect the 6.6 g 
WGPu sample, while Figure 4-6b shows that this statement holds even when the source transit 
speed is raised to 2.2 m/s. Figure 4-6c shows the effects of adding 1 cm thick steel source 
shielding, which further lower the average number of gamma-ray photons detected by the 
pedestrian RPM, but still results in a 100% detection rate. 
 The 51 g HEU sample was also reliably detected, as shown in Figure 4-7a. However, the 
pedestrian RPM exhibits the most difficulty with low energy gamma-ray photon sources, like 
241
Am. Despite using source activity almost 30% higher than prescribed by ANSI [38], Figure 4-
7b shows that the pedestrian RPM alarm threshold is barely low enough to reliably alarm on the 
241
Am source travelling at 1.2 m/s. When the source transit speed is raised to 2.2 m/s the 




Fig. 4-6.     Histograms of measured gamma-ray photons for 30 three second measurements of a 6.6 g sample of 
WGPu moving at 1.2 m/s past the pedestrian RPM. Histograms are shown for different test scenarios: (a) 1.2 m/s 
source transit speed; source unshielded, (b) 2.2 m/s source transit speed; source unshielded, and (c) 2.2 m/s source 
transit speed; source shielded with 1 cm steel. These histograms correspond to the data from folders (a) 21, (b) 22, 
and (c) 23 in Table B-1 in Appendix B. These measurements were part of the pedestrian RPM gamma-ray photon 
alarm testing during the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark in February 2014 at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, 
Italy [39,41]. The 3,856 gamma-ray photons alarm threshold shown is set five standard deviations above the mean 






Fig. 4-7.     Histograms of measured gamma-ray photons for 30 three second measurements with the pedestrian RPM 
of: (a) 51 g sample of HEU moving at 1.2 m/s, (b) 2,220 kBq 
241
Am moving at 1.2 m/s, and (c)  2,220 kBq 
241
Am 
moving at 2.2 m/s. These histograms correspond to the data from folders (a) 40, (b) 35, and (c) 34 in Table B-1 in 
Appendix B. These measurements were part of the pedestrian RPM gamma-ray photon alarm testing during the 2
nd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark in February 2014 at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy [39,41]. The 3,856 




4.4.2. Vehicle RPM Gamma-Ray Photon Alarm Results 
 Identical to the vehicle RPM neutron alarm tests, the vehicle gamma-ray photon alarm 
tests require that sources travel at 2.2 m/s. The distance between a two pillar vehicle RPM should 
be 5 m. The same ANSI sources and associated source activities (Table 4-1) used for the 
pedestrian RPMs should be detected at least 59 out of 60 times with the vehicle RPM [38]. 
 Vehicle RPM gamma-ray photon alarm tests were successfully performed at the 3
rd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy, in November 2014 
[40,77]. Once again, due to time constraints anywhere between 30 and 43 passages were run per 
source scenario as opposed to the minimum of 60 trials suggested by ANSI [38].The source 
activities used (see Table 4-1 and Table 4-5) were as much as 80% lower than prescribed by 
ANSI [38], making these test conditions quite challenging. Exceptions to this were the two low 




Am, for which a majority of SCINTILLA 
participants requested that higher activity sources be used in the tests. 
 The full set of tests and results achieved with our vehicle RPM for these gamma-ray 
photon alarm tests are presented in Table 4-5. The results were very mixed. For source activities 
well below the ANSI-suggested activity, like the 107 kBq vs 518 kBq 
133
Ba, the vehicle RPM 
had zero successful alarms. For higher energy gamma-ray photons sources and sources with 
activities closer to the ANSI-recommended values, the vehicle RPM performed satisfactorily. 
 The sensitivity of both RPMs to detection scenarios beyond ANSI standards could be 









Table 4-5. Results of November 2014 3
rd
 SCINTILLA benchmark vehicle RPM gamma-ray photon alarm 
test results [40,77] for ANSI [38] and beyond ANSI standard test conditions using a variety of gamma-ray photon 
sources. 
Isotope Activity (kBq) Speed (m/s) Source Height (m) Passages Alarms 
241
Am 1,480 2.2 0.8 32 1 
241
Am 2,220 2.2 0.8 32 5 
133
Ba 107 2.2 0.8 35 0 
133
Ba 212 2.2 0.8 33 32 
133
Ba 107 1.2 0.6 32 0 
57
Co 262 2.2 0.8 34 0 
57
Co 333 2.2 0.6 30 0 
60
Co 181 1.2 0.6 43 38 
137
Cs 350 2.2 0.8 32 26 
226
Ra 290 2.2 0.8 30 30 
226
Ra 290 1.2 0.6 32 31 
137
Cs 350 2.2 1.7 32 28 
137
Cs 350 2.2 2.4 30 15 
60
Co 826 2.2 0.8 32 32 
60
Co 826 2.2 0.8 32 32 
137
Cs 3,500 2.2 0.8 32 31 
137
Cs 3,500 1.2 0.6 32 30 
WGPu 6.6 g 2.2 0.8 31 7 






Chapter 5                                                                                    
Reducing Nuisance Alarms Through On-The-Fly Radionuclide 
Identification 
 
5.1. Challenges for On-The-Fly Identification 
On-the-fly radionuclide identification, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, could provide 
some cost and time savings to CBP by lowering the number of nuisance alarms that would need 
to undergo a secondary inspections. Ideally, any alarm during primary inspection would report 
identified radionuclides with some associated certainty. For cases in which clearly only NORM 
or medical isotopes are present, secondary inspections could be skipped. 
In Chapter 2 the differences between organic scintillators, like those used for the RPMs 
in Chapter 4, and inorganic scintillators and semi-conductor-based gamma-ray photon detectors 
were discussed. The latter two detector types depend upon the photo-electric effect to form 
distinct full energy photopeaks in their PHDs. These photopeaks are characteristic of a given 
isotope’s decay scheme, like the many photopeaks of WGPu shown in a PHD taken with a high 
purity Germanium (HPGe) semi-conductor-based gamma-ray photon detector (see Figure 5-1).  
Organic scintillators completely rely upon Compton scattering for detecting incident 
gamma-ray photons. Therefore a PHD of WGPu acquired with the liquid scintillator-based RPM 
will show no characteristic photopeaks even for a long measurement time. In a realistic RPM 
measurement scenario, long measurement times are a luxury that is rarely granted. Measurement 
times on the order of three seconds are common. Figure 5-2 shows PHDs before and after 
background subtraction. These PHDs were acquired with the pedestrian RPM during a three 
second measurement of 6.6 g WGPu moving past the RPM at 1.2 m/s. Background radiation 
subtraction and the short measurement time result in a jittery PHD with no immediately 
discernible features that would identify the radiation source as WGPu to the naked eye. 
In the following sections a variety of algorithms are discussed that were implemented to 




Figure 5-1. Example of a gamma-ray photon PHD of 500 g metal WGPu sample (6% 
240
Pu) acquired with 
coaxial HPGe detector [78,79]. Peaks without isotope label stem directly from 
239
Pu decay, while other peaks stem 
from other isotopes always found in WGPu, such as 
241




Figure 5-2. Gamma-ray photon PHDs before (blue squares) and after (red circles) background subtraction for 
three second dynamic measurement of 6.6 g WGPu with pedestrian RPM during 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC 
Ispra, Italy, in February 2014 [39,80,81]. Such a background subtracted PHD would provide the raw basis for any 
subsequent on-the-fly radionuclide identification attempts [39,80].    
5.2. Identification Using Least Squares Comparison with Modified PHDs 
The first rudimentary radionuclide identification algorithm implemented for the 
pedestrian RPM utilized a least squares comparison between the short three-second PHDs of the 
moving sources and the much longer previously acquired library spectra shown in Figure 5-3. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2.2, the organic scintillators are energy calibrated assuming 80% of the 
137
Cs Compton edge corresponds to the expected 478 keVee light output. The calibration gives 
the linear relationship between the pulse height in Volts and light output in keVee. The 2 V 
dynamic range of the V1720 digitizer used for the pedestrian RPM is insufficient to capture the 
full PHDs of both low energy gamma-ray photon emitting sources, like 
241
Am, and high energy 
gamma-ray photon emitting sources, like 
40
K. Therefore, as shown in Figure 5-3, one set of 
detectors was calibrated at a higher gain to capture the PHDs of the lower energy gamma-ray 
photons, while another set of detectors was calibrated at a lower gain to capture the full PHDs of 
higher energy gamma-ray photons. Not all isotopes in the library PHDs ended up being used in 









Figure 5-3. High (a) and low (b) gain matrices used as library spectra for on-the-fly radionuclide identification 
with the pedestrian RPM at the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at the JRC Ispra, Italy, in February 2014. Measurement 
times for all PHDs exceeded 600 s. Of the eight detectors, five used the high gain setting and three used the low gain 
setting [39,80]. 
 The identification methodology relies on finding the lowest residual value (𝑆𝑖) when 
doing a least squares comparison between the dynamic three second measurement PHD and all 
of the library PHDs using equation (5-1): 
                                                                                 𝑆𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑚𝑏 − 𝑙𝑖𝑏)
2𝐵
𝑏=1 ,                                                           (5-1) 
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where B is the number of bins in the PHD, mb is the preprocessed count rate in the b
th
 bin of the 
PHD, and lib is the preprocessed count rate in the b
th
 bin of the i
th
 isotope in the library. Figure 5-
4a shows a three second measurement of 
57
Co using the pedestrian RPM during the 2
nd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark. Included in this Figure is the 
57
Co library PHD that the three second 
measurement should match, in theory.  In practice, the three second measurement is very noisy 
resulting in large residuals for all PHD comparisons. Therefore a number of modifications are 
performed on both the three second and library PHDs to improve the identification accuracy. 
The background radiation PHD that is subtracted from the three second measurement has 
excellent statistics due to the much longer measurement time. The three second measurements 
have poor statistics and only very few counts in most PHD bins. Therefore it is probable that the 
background corrected three second PHDs will showcase jitter and exhibit many bins with 
negative counts. These negative count bins substantially add to the residual value, especially for 
low energy gamma-ray photon PHDs for which only a few bins contain a substantial number of 
counts. Therefore, the first step is to filter out some of the noise by zeroing out all PHD bins with 
negative counts or counts below some small user defined threshold. Figure 5-4b shows the much 
cleaner 
57
Co PHD after this noise suppression has been applied. 
To increase the statistics of individual PHD bins, bin coarsening was applied, as shown 
for the same 
57
Co PHD in Figure 5-4c.  Too much bin coarsening, however, will eliminate 
characteristic features in the PHDs. A bin coarsening factor of two was found to give satisfactory 
results [39,80]. 
Finally one has to also decide which lowest residual value to use: the overall lowest 
residual, or the lowest residual from the low or the high gain matrix? The algorithm uses three 
criteria to make a selection. A high energy gamma-ray photon will create more counts in the low 
gain detector PHDs than in high gain detector PHDs. The ratio of counts in the low gain versus 
the high gain detectors is used as the first decision-making criteria. If this ratio exceeds 0.75, it is 
assumed that a high energy gamma-ray photon source was being measured, so the lowest 
residual value of the low gain detector set is chosen. For very low count rate scenarios, however, 
the ratio might be meaningless. When there are fewer than 50 counts in the low gain detectors, 
the identification result from the low gain detectors is thrown out. Finally, if neither of the 
previous two criteria leads to a conclusive answer, then simply the lowest residual value is used 
65 
 
to pick the radionuclide [39,80]. Originally the method also included the use of user-defined 
weighting masks, but these had mixed effects on the identification results and were deemed to be 
too arbitrary [80]. 
The radionuclide identification results for samples measured with the pedestrian RPM at 
the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at the JRC Ispra, Italy, in February 2014 are listed in Table 5-1. 
The identification results are listed for both high- and low-gain detectors as the PHDs are 
modified step by step. The final identification results were excellent for 
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Cs.  The WGPu was misidentified for all thirty trials. 
Figure 5-5 shows that the library WGPu PHD does not match the PHDs from the dynamic 
WGPu measurements. Possible explanations could include improper gain settings when 
measuring the WGPu library PHD. Overall, the modified PHD least squares method did not 
produce high quality and fidelity identification results, and relied too heavily on user choices, 





Figure 5-4. PHD modification steps for a three second 
57
Co measurement with pedestrian RPM at February 
2014 SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC Ispra, Italy. All PHDs are subdivided into 200 bins. See Figure 5-3a for 
energy scale. (a) Background corrected three second PHD (blue) versus library spectrum of 
57
Co (red) from Figure 
5-3a; (b) PHDs after noise suppression has been applied to zero out negative and low count rate bins; (c) PHDs after 







Table 5-1. Correct radionuclide identification using the modified least squares method out of 30 trials for 
different isotopes measured with the pedestrian RPM at the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at the JRC Ispra, Italy, in 
February 2014 [39,80]. Identification results are shown for both high- and low-gain detector sets, and for the 













Raw Spectrum 0 23 0 0 30 0 9 0 19 0 23 27 30 0 
Noise Suppression 0 19 0 0 30 0 9 0 18 0 10 23 30 0 
Bin Coarsening 0 19 0 0 30 0 12 0 20 0 11 22 30 0 
Final HG/LG Selection 14 0 30 12 20 11 30 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Average dynamically measured PHD for WGPu and WGPu library PHD for pedestrian RPM at 
2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC Ispra, Italy, in February 2014. These two PHDs do not match well, explaining 
why WGPu was never identified correctly [39]. 
 
5.3. Identification Using Least Squares Comparison with Cumulative 
Distribution Functions 
The least squares method with modified PHDs described in 5.2 did not consistently 
produce satisfactory radionuclide identification results for the set of radionuclides measured with 
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the pedestrian RPM. Its multi-step process and reliance on user-defined parameters made the 
method inelegant and convoluted. A simpler, more robust, and more successful radionuclide 
identification algorithm had to be developed. All background corrected measured PHDs were 
saved, so other identification algorithms could easily be tested on the dataset. 
The goal of all developed identification algorithms was to find a bridge between the 
jittery dynamically measured PHDs with low counting statistics, and the smooth and well-
defined library PHDs of radionuclides used for identification. In the previous method this was 
attempted through de-emphasizing unimportant PHD regions through noise suppression, and 
emphasizing distinctive PHD features through bin coarsening and weighting functions. 
The next proposed radionuclide identification method uses least squares comparisons of 
modified CDFs of both the library PHDs and the dynamically measured PHDs. It is hypothesized 
that CDFs would smooth out the statistical jitter of the short measurement time dynamically 
measured PHDs, while also preserving and emphasizing any distinctive PHD features that might 
not be obvious when viewing the noisy unmodified PHDs.  
The CDF, 𝑥(𝑛), of any distribution 𝐹𝑋 (𝑥) represents the probability that X takes a value 
less than x, i.e., 𝑃(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥). The PHD is integrated bin-by-bin, thus expressing what fraction of 
the total PHD exists to the left of each bin. Our subsequent analysis uses 𝑦(𝑛) = (1 − 𝑥(𝑛)). 
The CDFs thus are formed by integrating the PHDs from right to left and normalizing to unity. 
The integration from high to low energy was chosen to minimize the effects of variable noise 
found at low energies right above the threshold [81]. The algorithm still utilizes equation (5-1) to 
compute the residual values when comparing dynamically measured 𝑦(𝑛) to the library 𝑦(𝑛) 
spectra. The radionuclide is identified by finding the library 𝑦(𝑛) that produces the smallest 
residual when compared with the dynamically measured 𝑦(𝑛). High- and low-gain 𝑦(𝑛) 
matrices are shown in Figures 5-6a and 5-6b. 
Figures 5-7a and 5-7b show examples of the three second dynamic measurements of 
radionuclides with the pedestrian RPM at the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark, and how their 𝑦(𝑛) 
spectra match well with the library 𝑦(𝑛) for a variety of radionuclides in the high- and low-gain 
matrices. While the modified PHD method required several steps and user chosen parameters to 
smoothen the jittery short measurement time PHDs, the CDF method only uses one operation to 
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transform a noisy and messy PHD into a form that is easily comparable and relatable to the 
smoother library 𝑦(𝑛). 
Table 5-2 compares the success rate of the modified PHD and CDF radionuclide 
identification methods for the pedestrian RPM data from the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC 
Ispra, Italy, from February 2014. With the exception of 
241
Am, all radionuclides were identified 
correctly at a significantly higher success rate, even at the higher source transit speed of 2.2 m/s. 
Nevertheless, the average correct radionuclide identification rate of 90%, while good for an 













Figure 5-6. (a) High-gain modified CDF library matrix for RPM radionuclide identification, (b) low-gain 






Figure 5-7. High-gain modified CDF library matrix for RPM radionuclide identification with 𝑦(𝑛) of dynamic 
measurements of (a) 
133
Ba and (b) 
137
Cs with pedestrian RPM at 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC Ispra, Italy, in 





Table 5-2. Comparison of correct radionuclide identifications out of 30 trials using the modified least 
squares method versus the CDF method for different isotopes measured with the pedestrian RPM at the 2
nd
 
SCINTILLA benchmark at the JRC Ispra, Italy, in February 2014 [39,80]. A slightly higher pulse height threshold 
of 0.06 V vs 0.03 V was used for the 
57
Co results. 
Source Speed [m/s] 
 
Modified PHD method 
Correct ID (#/30) 
CDF method 
Correct ID (#/30) 
137
Cs 1.2 11 27 
137
Cs 2.2 3 25 
HEU 1.2 30 30 
HEU 2.2 30 25 
60
Co 1.2 14 26 
60












1.2 12 25 
241
Am 1.2 20 13 
 
5.4. Adding Medical Isotopes to the Mix 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, medical isotopes, especially 
99m
Tc, have become a common source of 
RPM nuisance alarms [30]. Therefore, it was highly desirable to add these isotopes to the RPM 
radionuclide identification library.  
 
Figure 5-8. Measuring medical isotopes with the pedestrian RPM at the University of Michigan’s 
C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital in December 2013. 
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In June 2016, medical isotope gamma-ray photon emissions were measured with four different 
detectors, including a 7.6 cm diameter and a 12.7 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid 
scintillation detector, a 5.1 cm diameter and 5.1 cm height cylindrical volume stilbene crystal from Inrad 
Optics, as well as an experimental 5.1 cm diameter and 5.1 cm height cylindrical volume plastic 
scintillator named BB3 from Radiation Monitoring Devices (see  Figure 5-9 for setup). 
 
Figure 5-9. June 2016 setup for measuring medical isotopes at University of Michigan’s C.S. Mott 
Children’s Hospital using: (a) a 7.6 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detector, (b) a 
5.1 cm diameter and 5.1 cm height cylindrical volume stilbene crystal from Inrad Optics, a 12.7 cm diameter 
cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detector (d) an experimental 5.1 cm diameter and 5.1 cm height 
cylindrical volume plastic scintillator name BB3 from Radiation Monitoring Devices [81]. 
The medical isotopes came in solution form packaged in glass vials. A total of seven medical 














Tl. At time of calibration each 
source had an activity of 7 − 8 𝜇𝐶𝑖 with a 20% uncertainty. The sources are pictured in Figure 5-10 and 
more source information is listed in Table 5-3. 
18
F has a relatively short half-life of 1.83 hours, so even 
though it was included in these measurements, it is considered to be a very unlikely source of nuisance 




Figure 5-10. 7 − 8 𝜇𝐶𝑖 medical isotope samples measured at the University of Michigan’s C.S. Mott 














Tl. Labeled activities 
are desired activities, which at times differed by 1 𝜇𝐶𝑖 from the actual activities listed on separate calibration source 
sheets provided by the hospital. 
Table 5-3. List of medical isotopes measured at University of Michigan’s C.S. Mott Children’s 
Hospital in June 2016 and their respective radioactive half-lives in hours, and their activities at time of sample 
calibration and at time we measured them [81].   
Isotope T
1/2 
[h] Activity at noon 
6/2/16 [mCi] ±20% 
Activity at time of 
measurement [mCi] ±20% 
99m
Tc 6.0 0.008 0.007 
123
I 13.3 0.007 0.007 
201
Tl 72.9 0.008 0.008 
131
I 192.5 0.008 0.008 
111
In 67.3 0.007 0.007 
18
F 1.8 0.007 0.001 
67
Ga 78.3 0.007 0.007 
 
Each of the seven medical sources was measured for thirty minutes. Four background 
measurements were taken interspersed throughout the day of the measurements. The background 
corrected CDFs of the PHDs measured with the 7.6 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid 
scintillation detector were added to the high gain identification matrix for the pedestrian RPM (see Figure 
5-6a). This updated identification matrix for low energy gamma-ray photon sources is shown in Figure 5-




Figure 5-11. High-gain modified CDF library matrix, including medical isotopes, for RPM 
radionuclide identification with 𝑦(𝑛) of measurement of 131I with pedestrian RPM detector at University of 
Michigan’s C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital in June 2016 [81]. 
From Figure 5-11 it becomes clear that the addition of many low gamma-ray photon energy 
emitting medical radionuclides increases the difficulty of correctly identifying any of the low energy 
sources. The performance of the least squares comparison identification method with CDFs, introduced in 
Section 5.4, degrades with the addition of more and more radionuclides to the library, so a more robust 
identification algorithm is needed. 
5.5. Identification Using Power Spectral Density and Spectral Angular 
Mapping 
 All of the previously described radionuclide identification algorithms worked well to a degree, 
but none of them were able to correctly identify nuisance and threat alarms 100% of the time. It would be 
entirely unacceptable for CBP to misidentify an HEU source as a benign medical source, as it would also 
be utterly embarrassing for CBP to cause a security panic if a medical isotope was misidentified as 
WGPu. While the modified CDFs do well at smoothing out the noisiness of the short measurement time 
PHDs, the least squares comparison does not constitute a robust enough identification metric. Two 
modified CDFs might look very similar to the naked eye overall. However, a small shift or offset, or an 
outlier data point in the short measurement time modified CDF could all easily lead to a large residual 




In other words, the least squares method compares the exact match of the two modified CDFs 
point by point, but says nothing about similarities in overall shapes and trends between two modified 
CDFs. The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) (see Equation 5-2) of 𝑦(𝑛) describes how rapidly 𝑦(𝑛) 
changes over its energy domain. A fast Fourier transform (FFT) speeds up the computation of the DFT 
which converts a signal in time into the frequency domain [82]. However, Fourier analysis can be applied 
to many other areas, such as image processing, so it could be a power tool in analyzing and comparing 
measured modified CDFs. 
                          𝐷𝐹𝑇(𝑘) = ∑ 𝑦(𝑛) exp (−𝑖 ∗ 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑖 ∗ (𝑘 − 1) ∗
𝑛−1
𝑁
) ,  1 <=  𝑘 <=  𝑁𝑁𝑛=1 ,                 (5-2) 
where DFT(k) is the amount of frequency in the signal, y(n) is the modified CDF, n is the sample energy 
domain, N is the number of samples, and k is the sample in the frequency domain. 
For a continuous signal, the power spectral density (Equation 5-3) computes how “power” is 
distributed over frequency of the CDF by computing the square of the DFT: 
                                                                            𝑃𝑆𝐷(𝑘) = |𝐷𝐹𝑇(𝑘)|2.                                                 (5-3) 
 In electrical engineering applications this “power” refers to actual physical power, for instance in 
a circuit, but for more abstract signals, like CDFs from RPMs, “power” has no physical meaning, so one 
can just think of power spectral density as the square value of the signal. The power spectral density 
provides a metric now to describe how the CDF behaves over its entire domain. So even though two 
CDFs might not look identical at first glance, they might behave very similarly thus suggesting they may 
have both arisen from the same radiation source. Examples of modified CDF, FFT, and power spectral 
density are shown for a dynamic 
137





Figure 5-12. Examples of (a) modified CDF (𝑦(𝑛)), (b) FFT, and (c) power spectral density for signal from a 
three second measurement of 
137
Cs with the pedestrian RPM at the SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC Ispra, Italy, in 
February 2014.   
Spectral angle mapping (SAM) offers a new way of comparing measured and reference spectra 
for the purpose of identifying radionuclides. SAM computes the spectral angle (in radians, see Equation 
5-4) between the power spectral density of the measured spectrum and a matrix of reference power 
spectral density spectra for the library of radionuclides. A smaller SAM value indicates better agreement 
between measured and reference spectra: 




],   [83]                                (5-4) 
where we compute the spectral angle 𝛼 between the power spectral density of a measured spectra and the 
library power spectral density spectra for any isotope 𝑖.  
SAM was developed by J. W. Boardman while working for the Center for the Study of Earth 
from Space (CSES), Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES), University 
of Colorado, Boulder USA in the early 1990s. SAM was developed to analyze spectral similarities 
between measured and reference spectra for imaging spectrometry for creating maps of the distribution of 
and composition of materials on the Earth’s surface [83,84]. The SAM method has since been widely 
adopted for a variety of image analysis needs [85–88], especially in environmental, earth, and space 
sciences, but also in limited ways in nuclear security applications [89,90]. SAM has not yet been used for 
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radionuclide identification. Figure 5-13 shows how SAM could be used to compare a reference spectrum 
to a measurement spectrum. A measurement spectrum would be compared to all library reference spectra 
representing the different radionuclides. The match with the smallest SAM value would be picked as the 
match. The absolute value of this SAM value could then also be used to quantify the confidence of the 
match being correct. The SAM analysis could be applied directly to the CDFs, as shown in Figure 5-13, 
or it could be applied to the power spectral densities of the measurement and reference CDFs. 
 
Figure 5-13. Example of SAM angle being computed between a RPM measured CDF and reference CDF of 
137
Cs. This process would be repeated for all data points in the measured spectrum. SAM values would then be 
computed for comparisons with all reference CDFs representing all library radionuclides. The overall smallest SAM 
value gives the likeliest radionuclide to cause the measured CDF. 
 For the following radionuclide identification analysis all isotopes shown in Figure 5-11, with the 
exception of 
18
F, are used. As previously mentioned, 
18
F is not considered a threat to cause RPM nuisance 
alarms due to its short half-life [28,30]. That leaves us with two SNM sources, six medical isotopes, and 
five industrial gamma-ray photon sources. The reference matrix consists of the power spectral densities of 
the long measurement time CDFs of these sources acquired at the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark and the 
University of Michigan’s C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital with the 7.6 cm diameter cylindrical volume 
EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detectors. 
 These reference spectra are compared with the pedestrian RPM data for the 30 trials per gamma-
ray photon source at 1.2 m/s source transit speed from the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark. The 











Cs (37), HEU (40), and WGPu (22). The 
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pedestrian RPM, on average, measured between 4,000 and 5,000 gamma-ray photons for the three second 
measurement time and 1.2 m/s source transit speed case at the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark. The 
background contribution to this number, however, is quite high, as the alarm level was set at 3,856 
gamma-ray photons. Therefore the net number of detected source gamma-ray photons per three second 
measurement varied between a few hundred and about a thousand. For the medical isotope data, the 
number of pulses processed for each of the  thirty trials was selected as to result in a similar number of net 
detected source photons after background subtraction. 
 For the previously described measurement conditions, the SAM method now gives 100% correct 
identification for all thirty trials of all thirteen radionuclides. An example of the SAM identification 




Tc is identified correctly for every single dataset. It is of great importance to know at what 
point this identification method starts breaking down. In other words, what is the minimum number of 
detected source gamma-ray photons needed for a consistently reliable source identification via this 
algorithm? For 
99m
Tc it was found that starting at around 400 net detected source pulses, the first 
misidentifications started occurring. Table B-3 shows that for this scenario two out of thirty 
99m
Tc datasets 
were misidentified as 
123
I, which has a very similar CDF to 
99m
Tc (see Figure 5-11). 
 Tables 5-4 and 5-5 list the average 𝛼 SAM values computed for the correct radionuclide for two 
different dataset scenarios. Table 5-4 uses the less challenging dataset containing the aforementioned 1.2 
m/s source transit speed SCINTILLA datasets and the medical radionuclide datasets containing 1,000 net 
accepted pulses. Table 5-5 uses a more challenging dataset containing the 2.2 m/s source transit speed 
SCINTILLA datasets and medical radionuclide datasets containing only 400 net accepted pulses. Two 




Co) exhibit the highest 𝛼 SAM 
values, indicating that these sources are the most difficult sources to correctly identify. Second, 𝛼 SAM 
values increase in Table 5-5 relative to Table 5-4. This increase confirms that using less data makes 
correct radionuclide identification more challenging. 
Table 5-4. Average and standard deviations of the SAM 𝛼 values computed for the correct isotope for thirty 
datasets for each of the 13 tested radionuclides. The SNM and industrial radionuclide datasets come from the 
datasets from Table B-1 listed previously in this section. The medical datasets consist of 1,000 net detected pulses 
from the respective medical sources. Examples of full datasets showing SAM 𝛼 values for all 30 datasets for one 
isotope for all possible radionuclide identification options are given in Tables B-2 and B-3 in Appendix B [81].   
 241Am 133Ba 57Co 137Cs HEU WGPu 67Ga 123I 131I 111In 99mTc 201Tl 
𝛼𝑎𝑣𝑔 0.0061 0.0040 0.0065 0.0049 0.0047 0.0031 0.0018 0.0030 0.0016 0.0017 0.0020 0.0019 




Table 5-5. Average and standard deviations of the SAM 𝛼 values computed for the correct isotope for thirty 
datasets for each of the 12 tested radionuclides. The SNM and industrial radionuclide datasets come from the 
following datasets from Table B-1 in Appendix B: folders 17, 21, 27,31, 34, 36. All of these tests are the same as 
those used for Table 5-4 except that the source transit speed is increased from 1.2 m/s to 2.2 m/s . The medical 
datasets consist of 400 net detected pulses from the respective medical sources, which is at the limit of detection for 
the pedestrian RPM for the background conditions and associated gamma alarm threshold used at the JRC Ispra 
[81].  
 241Am 133Ba 57Co 137Cs HEU WGPu 67Ga 123I 131I 111In 99mTc 201Tl 
𝛼𝑎𝑣𝑔 0.0072 0.0051 0.0076 0.0060 0.0062 0.0043 0.0034 0.0047 0.0030 0.0017 0.0037 0.0036 
𝛼𝑠𝑡𝑑 8.2E-04 6.9E-04 1.1E-03 5.0E-04 6.6E-04 5.6E-04 3.7E-4 4.9E-04 2.5E-04 2.0E-04 4.7E-04 3.7E-04 
 
 One must also take into account that even a nonsensical input will result in an 𝛼 SAM value. 
Three  such inputs, that should not result in a positive identification of any of the reference spectra, are 
shown in Figure 5-14. The 𝛼 SAM values resulting from these inputs are listed in Table 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-14. Non-source inputs for testing the radionuclide identification algorithms. Test inputs include the 
CDFs of a gamma ray PHD background measurement, a linear function through the origin, and a square function 




Table 5-6. SAM 𝛼-values computed for the test cases shown in Figure 5-14. As none of these inputs should 
match any of the reference spectra, the 𝛼 SAM values should be larger than, for example, the average 𝛼 SAM value 
of 0.003 ± 0.000 for positive identification of WGPu shown in the right most column [81]. 






Am 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.008±0.001 
133
Ba 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.006±0.000 
57
Co 0.020 0.014 0.009 0.005±0.001 
137
Cs 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.009±0.001 
HEU 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.005±0.001 
226
Ra 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.007±0.001 
WGPu 0.019 0.013 0.007 0.003±0.000 
67
Ga 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.008±0.001 
123
I 0.026 0.020 0.014 0.011±0.001 
131
I 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.009±0.001 
111
In 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.009±0.001 
99m
Tc 0.028 0.022 0.016 0.013±0.001 
201
Tl 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.008±0.001 
 
 Overall, however, the SAM and power spectral density method shows tremendous improvement 
over the methods described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. If this new method had been implemented earlier, we 
would have shown perfect identification results with the pedestrian RPM at the 2
nd
 SCINTILLA 
benchmark for all sources travelling at 1.2 m/s. Section 5-6 attempts to quantify how the different 
radionuclide identification algorithms match up against each other. 
 
5.6 Comparison of radionuclide identification methods using F-scores 
 F-scores provide a statistical measure of radionuclide identification algorithm 
performance, while also factoring in a system’s susceptibility to false negatives, i.e. not even 
alarming on a present source [91].The F-score (F) (Equation 5-7) utilizes both precision (p) and 
recall (r) values shown in Equations 5-5 and 5-6. Precision and recall values are based upon the 
system’s true positive alarms and correct IDs (𝑡𝑝), incorrect IDs or false positives (𝑓𝑝), and not 
seeing a present source or false negatives (𝑓𝑛): 
                                                                       𝑝 =
𝑡𝑝
𝑡𝑃+𝑓𝑝
,                                                            (5-5) 
                                                                          𝑟 =
𝑡𝑝
𝑡𝑝+𝑓𝑛
,                                                             (5-6) 
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                                                                  𝐹 =
(1+𝛽2)𝑝𝑟
𝛽2𝑝+𝑟
,                                                            (5-7) 
 where 𝛽 is a weighting factor that can be used to emphasize the importance of precision 
(higher correct ID rate at cost of more false negatives) versus recall (lower false positive rate at 
cost of worse correct ID rate). In the former case, a 𝛽 value of 2 might be chosen, whereas in the 
latter case a 𝛽 value of 0.5 might be chosen. A 𝛽 value of 1 indicates no bias towards either 
precision or recall. 
 The three different isotope identification algorithms introduced in Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 
5.5 are compared for a mixture of SCINTILLA and medical isotope data in Table 5-7 [81]. The 
F-scores reveal the CDF method was an improvement over the modified PHD method, while the 
power spectral density and spectral angular mapper-based identification radionuclide 
identification algorithm performs best overall. Even this method has its limitation too. Table 5-8 
compares F-scores for the dataset used in Table 5-7 with a more challenging dataset for which 
the 2.2 m/s versus 1.2 m/s source transit speed datasets are used from SCINTILLA and only 400 
versus 1,000 good pulses are used for each medical isotope data trial. While the F-scores 
decrease to 0.91 for this more challenging dataset, the power spectral density and spectral 
angular mapper-based identification algorithm still manages to outperform the other algorithms’ 
performances even though these inferior algorithms are using a less challenging dataset. 
 Many different algorithms were explored with the goal of performing on-the-fly 
radionuclide identification with organic scintillators. The most challenging sources to detect 




Co. The identification algorithm 
using power spectral density and spectral angular mapper showed the most promise in the end. 
This algorithm resulted in a very high positive identification rate even for low energy gamma-ray 







Table 5-7. Precision, recall, and F-scores computed for SCINTILLA pedestrian RPM datasets with 1.2 m/s 
source transit speed, and medical isotope datasets consisting of 1,000 good pulses. The following three isotope 
identification algorithms are compared: identification using least squares comparison with modified PHDs from 
Section 5.2 (Method 1), identification using least squares comparison with cumulative distribution functions from 
Section 5.3 (Method 2), and identification using power spectral density and spectral angular mapper from Section 
5.5 [81]. 
 Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 
Precision 0.58 0.70 1.0 
Recall 0.99 0.99 1.0 
    
F(𝛽 = 1) 0.73 0.82 1.0 
F(𝛽 = 0.5) 0.63 0.74 1.0 
F(𝛽 = 2) 0.87 0.92 1.0 
 
Table 5-8. Precision, recall, and F-scores computed for two datasets. Dataset 1 contains SCINTILLA 
pedestrian RPM datasets with 1.2 m/s source transit speed, and medical isotope datasets consisting of 1,000 good 
pulses. The more challenging dataset 2 contains the 2.2 m/s source transit speed SCINTILLA datasets and medical 
radionuclide datasets containing only 400 net accepted pulses. F-scores are computed for both datasets using the 
identification algorithm using power spectral density and spectral angular mapper from Section 5.5 [81]. 
 
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 
Precision 1.0 0.90 
Recall 1.0 0.92 
   
F(𝛽 = 1) 1.0 0.91 
F(𝛽 = 0.5) 1.0 0.91 
F(𝛽 = 2) 1.0 0.91 
 
5.7 Identifying Multiple Isotopes Simultaneously 
 So far all examples have only involved the presence of a single radionuclide. Correctly 
identifying two or more present radionuclides simultaneously represents a serious escalation in 
problem difficulty and complexity. Two scenarios must be addressed for a typical RPM. The first 
scenario involves the presence of two or more nuisance sources. For example, a truck driver 
might have recently undergone a nuclear medicine procedure and the truck driver might be 
transporting a large shipment of NORM-bearing cargo. The resulting mixed radiation signal 
must be resolved by the RPM and must not result in a misidentification. The second scenario 
involves an attempt to mask an SNM source with a NORM or medical source. The NORM to 
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SNM signal ratio would ideally be high as to spoof the RPM operator into believing that only a 
harmless NORM source is present. 
 Linear spectral un-mixing (LSU) algorithms are commonly used to dissect a mixed signal 
into its constituent components [92–94]. This algorithm assumes that the mixed signal 𝑀 
consists of a linear combination of 𝑛 possible source terms (radionuclides 𝑆𝑖) at different 
fractions 𝑐𝑖 as shown in Equation 5-8: 
                                          𝑀 = 𝑐1𝑆1 + 𝑐2𝑆2 + ⋯ + 𝑐𝑛𝑆𝑛.                                            (5-8) 
One then calculates all difference equations simultaneously between 𝑀 and all reference 
spectra 𝑆𝑖 for all values of 𝑐𝑖 constrained to 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0 (Equation 5-9). One then solves for minima to 
get best fit values for 𝑐𝑖 as shown in Equation 5-10: 
                                       𝑀 − 𝑐1𝑆1 − 𝑐2 𝑆2 − ⋯ 𝑐𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛,                                       (5-9) 
                                          min𝑐‖𝑺 ∗ 𝑐 − 𝑀‖,  𝑐 ≥ 0  .                                                (5-10) 
The mixed source signal array M and reference matrix S could consist of gamma-ray 
PHDs, CDFs, or power spectral densities of CDFs. A code was written to test all three data 
formats with M containing up to three isotopes mixed in user-defined ratios. The simplest 
scenario involves an un-mixed single source. The results for 1.2 m/s source transit speed 
pedestrian RPM 
137
Cs and WGPu data are shown in Table 5-9. The coefficients for the correct 
radionuclide, in particular in the case of the WGPu, show a high degree of variability between 
datasets. Overall, however, the coefficient for the correct isotope clearly stands out against the 








Table 5-9. Isotope fraction coefficients computed for an LSU algorithm for un-mixing pedestrian 
RPM data consisting solely of WGPu or 
137
Cs measurements. The averages and standard deviations of 
coefficients computed for each possible isotope use 30 three second measurement data sets as inputs. Inputs 
are either PHDs, modified CDFs (𝑦(𝑛)), or power spectral densities of 𝑦(𝑛). 
 
100% WGPu 100% Cs137 
Isotopes PHD LSU CDF LSU CDF PSD LSU PHD LSU CDF LSU CDF PSD LSU 
241Am 0.19±0.13 0.11±0.12 0.18±0.14 0.05±0.07 0.01±0.03 0.03±0.05 
133Ba 0.07±0.12 0.05±0.08 0.07±0.12 0.01±0.03 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.02 
57Co  0.06±0.08 0.02±0.04 0.03±0.06 0.02±0.05 0.00±0.01 0.01±0.02 
137Cs 0.01±0.02 0.00±0.00 0.01±0.03 0.75±0.14 0.93±0.12 0.85±0.09 
HEU   0.05±0.09 0.00±0.01 0.02±0.04 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.01 
226Ra 0.01±0.04 0.00±0.00 0.01±0.03 0.00±0.02 0.01±0.05 0.00±0.01 
WGPu  0.47±0.29 0.66±0.20 0.53±0.27 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 
18F   0.02±0.04 0.00±0.01 0.01±0.03 0.07±0.07 0.03±0.07 0.08±0.08 
67Ga  0.01±0.03 0.03±0.06 0.01±0.04 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.00 
123I  0.01±0.03 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.04 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.00 
131I  0.05±0.06 0.04±0.05 0.03±0.05 0.03±0.05 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.04 
111In 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.03 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.00±0.00 
99mTc  0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.00 
201Tl 0.03±0.08 0.03±0.05 0.02±0.06 0.01±0.04 0.00±0.00 0.01±0.03 
 
Table 5-10 shows LSU results for two sources mixed in a 1:1 ratio. The 1:1 mixture of 




Ga un-mixes nearly perfectly with the LSU code. The 
CDFs in question, including the CDF for the mixed source are given in Figure 5-15. The 
averaged un-mixing results for 𝑐𝑖 are shown in pie chart for in Figure 5-16. For the 1:1 mixture 
of 
137
Cs and WGPu, the 
137
Cs is easily identified at approximately the correct percentage, but the 
WGPu content, while mostly noticeably above any of the absent sources, is significantly 
underestimated. However, for purposes of RPM operation it is most important that the presence 
of SNM is detected. The estimate of the exact ratio of which it might be present with other 






Table 5-10. Isotope fraction coefficients computed for an LSU algorithm for un-mixing pedestrian 






Cs and WGPu mixed in a 1:1 ratio. The averages and standard 
deviations of coefficients computed for each possible isotope use 30 three second measurement data sets as 
inputs. Inputs are either PHDs, modified CDFs (𝑦(𝑛)), or power spectral densities of 𝑦(𝑛). 
 1:1 99mTc:67Ga 1:1 137Cs:WGPu 
Isotopes PHD LSU CDF LSU CDF PSD LSU PHD LSU CDF LSU CDF PSD LSU 
241Am 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.14±0.09 0.17±0.07 0.15±0.08 
133Ba 0.00±0.01 0.01±0.01 0.00±0.01 0.03±0.06 0.05±0.09 0.02±0.04 
57Co 0.01±0.01 0.01±0.01 0.01±0.01 0.06±0.07 0.07±0.08 0.07±0.07 
137Cs 0.00±0.01 0.02±0.01 0.04±0.03 0.40±0.11 0.41±0.11 0.52±0.10 
HEU 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.03±0.05 0.02±0.05 0.02±0.05 
226Ra 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.00 0.09±0.13 0.06±0.12 0.07±0.10 
WGPu 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.14±0.18 0.05±0.10 0.08±0.12 
18F 0.01±0.01 0.00±0.00 0.03±0.02 0.03±0.04 0.04±0.05 0.02±0.04 
67Ga 0.41±0.06 0.42±0.05 0.25±0.08 0.00±0.01 0.02±0.04 0.00±0.00 
123I 0.01±0.03 0.02±0.04 0.01±0.03 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.01 0.01±0.02 
131I 0.02±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.05±0.04 0.04±0.07 0.05±0.07 0.02±0.05 
111In 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 0.00±0.00 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.04 0.01±0.02 
99mTc 0.50±0.04 0.49±0.04 0.53±0.05 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.02 
201Tl 0.01±0.03 0.00±0.00 0.08±0.06 0.02±0.04 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.04 
 
 








Figure 5-16. Average isotope fraction coefficients, 𝑐𝑖, computed for an LSU algorithm for un-mixing pedestrian 




Tc mixed in a 1:1 ratio. The averages and standard deviations of coefficients 
computed for each possible isotope use 30 three second measurement data sets as inputs. Inputs are PHDs. 
A more challenging scenario involves the mixing of sources in unequal proportions. This 
represents a masking scenario in which a stronger (benign) source is used to overshadow the 
signatures of a weaker but illicit radiation source. Table 5-11 shows LSU un-mixing results for 
137
Cs and WGPu pedestrian RPM data mixed in a 2:1 and 1:2 ratio. The ratios might not 
reconstruct perfectly in the LSU results, but the trends between the 1:2 versus 2:1 ratio are 
apparent. Both sources are clearly identified in the 1:2 source ratio scenario, but the WGPu is 
barely detected in many of the 2:1 
137




Table 5-11. Isotope fraction coefficients computed for an LSU algorithm for un-mixing pedestrian 
RPM data consisting of 
137
Cs and WGPu in a 2:1 or 1:2 ratio. The averages and standard deviations of 
coefficients computed for each possible isotope use 30 three second measurement data sets as inputs. Inputs 
are either PHDs, modified CDFs (𝑦(𝑛)), or power spectral densities of 𝑦(𝑛). 
 
 2:1 137Cs:WGPu 1:2 137Cs:WGPu 
Isotopes PHD LSM CDF LSM CDF PSD LSM PHD LSM CDF LSM CDF PSD LSM 
241Am 0.10±0.08 0.13±0.07 0.11±0.08 0.17±0.10 0.20±0.09 0.18±0.10 
133Ba 0.03±0.06 0.03±0.07 0.01±0.04 0.05±0.07 0.07±0.12 0.03±0.05 
57Co 0.05±0.07 0.06±0.08 0.05±0.07 0.06±0.07 0.08±0.08 0.07±0.07 
137Cs 0.56±0.12 0.59±0.13 0.67±0.09 0.24±0.10 0.24±0.08 0.34±0.11 
HEU 0.02±0.03 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.05 0.04±0.07 0.03±0.07 0.03±0.06 
226Ra 0.06±0.09 0.03±0.10 0.03±0.07 0.09±0.14 0.05±0.11 0.08±0.12 
WGPu 0.07±0.10 0.01±0.04 0.03±0.06 0.23±0.22 0.14±0.17 0.17±0.18 
18F 0.03±0.04 0.04±0.06 0.03±0.04 0.03±0.04 0.03±0.04 0.02±0.04 
67Ga 0.00±0.01 0.01±0.04 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.02 0.01±0.04 0.00±0.00 
123I 0.00±0.01 0.00±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.03 
131I 0.03±0.06 0.04±0.05 0.02±0.04 0.05±0.07 0.07±0.07 0.03±0.07 
111In 0.01±0.02 0.03±0.03 0.00±0.01 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.04 0.01±0.01 
99mTc 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 
201Tl 0.01±0.03 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.03 0.02±0.05 0.01±0.03 0.02±0.04 
 
 Finally, Table 5-12 contains LSU results for a source consisting of three radionuclides 
together, namely WGPU (SNM), 
137
Cs (industrial), and 
99m
Tc (medical) in 1:3:1 ratio. The CDFs 
in question, including the CDF for the mixed source are given in Figure 5-17. The averaged un-
mixing results for 𝑐𝑖 are shown in pie chart for in Figure 5-18.The presence of all three isotopes 
is clear in the un-mixed identification results, though 
241
Am is erroneously also identified. This is 
the lowest energy gamma-ray source considered, and its CDF and PHD lines up with the low 
energy portion of many other sources, thus causing it to often look similar to other sources. 
241
Am also contributes heavily as a decay product to the gamma emissions from WGPu. 
241
Am 
has a specific intensity of 4.54 ∗ 1010
𝛾
𝑠  𝑔
 for its characteristic 60 keV gamma ray. This value is 
orders of magnitudes higher than the specific activities for many of the most common plutonium 
characteristic gamma ray photons. Even though 
241
Am only accounts for a tenth of a percent of 
the mass of the JRC WGPu sample, its high specific decay activity results in the 
241
Am 60 keV 
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gamma ray accounting for over 97% of the WGPu sample gamma ray emissions. The frequent 
misidentification of WGPu as 
241
Am therefore should not be surprising. 
Overall, it is unclear whether using PHDs, CDFs, or power spectral densities as inputs for 
a LSU algorithm will produce the best results. However, with data of high statistical uncertainty 
and no isotope characteristic photopeaks, it is remarkable to what degree the constituents of a 
mixed source consisting of up to three radionuclides can be correctly identified. 
  
Table 5-12. Isotope fraction coefficients computed for an LSU algorithm for un-mixing pedestrian RPM data 
consisting of 
137
Cs, WGPu, and 
99m
Tc mixed in a 1:3:1. The averages and standard deviations of coefficients 
computed for each possible isotope use 30 three second measurement data sets as inputs. Inputs are either PHDs, 
modified CDFs (𝑦(𝑛)), or power spectral densities of 𝑦(𝑛). 
 1:3:1 137Cs:WGPu:99mTc 
Isotopes PHD LSU CDF LSU CDF PSD LSU 
241Am 0.12±0.10 0.16±0.08 0.18±0.07 
133Ba 0.03±0.07 0.03±0.06 0.00±0.00 
57Co 0.06±0.06 0.10±0.10 0.09±0.08 
137Cs 0.13±0.07 0.14±0.05 0.32±0.07 
HEU 0.03±0.05 0.03±0.07 0.05±0.07 
226Ra 0.03±0.08 0.02±0.05 0.01±0.03 
WGPu 0.28±0.22 0.17±0.16 0.07±0.11 
18F 0.02±0.04 0.02±0.03 0.02±0.03 
67Ga 0.01±0.02 0.01±0.03 0.00±0.00 
123I 0.01±0.03 0.01±0.02 0.05±0.06 
131I 0.04±0.05 0.07±0.06 0.00±0.01 
111In 0.01±0.02 0.02±0.03 0.00±0.00 
99mTc 0.19±0.04 0.20±0.04 0.20±0.07 





Figure 5-17. Library CDFs and example of RPM data consisting of 
137
Cs, WGPu, and 
99m
Tc mixed in a 1:3:1 
ratio.  
 
Figure 5-18. Average isotope fraction coefficients, 𝑐𝑖, computed for an LSU algorithm for un-mixing pedestrian 
RPM data consisting of 
137
Cs, WGPu, and 
99m
Tc mixed in a 1:3:1 ratio. The averages and standard deviations of 




Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 In the first 2016 United States Presidential debate candidate Hillary Clinton said the 
following about her opponent and nuclear weapons: “And, in fact, his cavalier attitude about 
nuclear weapons is so deeply troubling. That is the number-one threat we face in the world. And 
it becomes particularly threatening if terrorists ever get their hands on any nuclear material [95].” 
Terrorists getting their hands on nuclear material is one of the major threats that RPMs address 
by making it difficult for terrorists to move nuclear and radiological material across borders with 
impunity. 
 RPMs screen vehicles, cargo, and people by looking for elevated neutron and gamma-ray 
photon count rates above natural background radiation. However, two challenges are hampering 
the effectiveness of our globally deployed RPM network. First, supplies of the detector material 
of choice for neutron detection, 
3
He, are gradually running out and are becoming prohibitively 
expensive. Second, the number of actual interdictions of nuclear and radiological materials pales 
in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of radiation nuisance alarms that RPM operators 
must sift through annually. Because RPMs only measure radiation count rates, the vast majority 
of currently deployed RPMs have no way of quickly distinguishing a radiation alarm caused by 
hidden SNM from radiation alarms caused by NORM-bearing cargo and recent nuclear medicine 
patients. Processing these nuisance alarms is time and money intensive for the RPM operators, it 
distracts from their actual mission and lowers the seriousness with which each subsequent RPM 
radiation alarm is treated, and it’s a nuisance to nuclear medicine patients and truck drivers who 
experience additional delays while crossing a border. 
 To address these aforementioned issues, we have developed RPMs that use alternatives to 
3
He for neutron detection, and that can perform on-the-fly radionuclide identification for gamma-
ray photon alarms. Modeling and lab-scale experiments were extensively used to investigate the 
feasibility of this undertaking and to design our RPM. MCNP models and ROC curve analysis 




 The RPM prototypes were extensively tested at two experimental campaigns at the 
European Commission Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, at a purpose-built RPM testing 
facility. This facility allowed for RPMs to be tested with moving radiation sources in a variety of 
shielding configurations. Sources included a variety of 
252
Cf neutron sources, industrial gamma-
ray photon sources, and, most importantly, actual SNM sources of HEU and WGPu. The RPMs 
were tested on their ability to not false alarm on occupancies in which only natural background 
radiation was present. Additionally RPMs were tested for their ability to alarm on the presence of 
(shielded) neutron and gamma-ray photon sources. Our prototypes performed exceedingly well 
in all of these categories [39]. 
 Reliable on-the-fly radionuclide identification is one of the cornerstones of this 
dissertation. The challenge of this undertaking is twofold. First, unlike inorganic scintillators and 
semi-conductor-based radiation detectors, organic scintillators provide no isotope-specific photo-
peak information. Instead organic scintillator output arises from Compton scattering interactions 
in the detectors. Second, RPM measurement times are incredibly short, on the order of three 
seconds, so the acquired signal is often poorly converged and exhibits dreadful statistics with so 
few measured data. Making a positive identification on such poor quality data is incredibly 
challenging. 
 In addition to the radionuclides measured in Italy, we measured seven different common 
medical isotopes at the University of Michigan’s C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital. Medical 
isotopes are a growing source of RPM nuisance alarms. In fact, in addition to kitty litter, the 
medical isotope 
99m
Tc is the most common source of RPM nuisance alarms[28,30]. Therefore it 
was crucial to add medical isotopes to our radionuclide identification efforts. 
  Many radionuclide identification algorithms were explored, developed, implemented, and 
then later discarded for not producing results with the type of reliability and precision required 
for such an important task. Initial efforts focused on template matching with reference PHDs 
using a least squares comparison method between measured and reference spectra. While many 
ways of improving this method were explored, none could completely overcome the inherent 
noisiness of the short measurement time PHDs. The next phase of algorithm development 
focused on using CDFs to smoothen the inherent noisiness of short measurement time PHDs. 
While this method led to drastic improvements for identifying some isotopes, the CDF  method 
93 
 
did not show improvements across the board for all radionuclides. Especially for lower energy 
gamma-ray photon emitting sources, too many radionuclides’ gamma-ray photon emissions 
resulted in CDFs too similar in appearance to be distinguished reliably through a simple least 
squares algorithm. Finally, Fourier analysis was used to compute the power spectral densities of 
CDFs. The power spectral densities of measured and reference spectra were compared with a 
spectral angle mapper to compute the best matches. This method resulted in near 100% correct 
identification rates for all SNM, industrial, and medical isotopes with datasets containing as few 
as 400 detected events from the radiation source. 
 F-score analysis was used to quantitatively compare the three developed radionuclide 
identification algorithms. For the less challenging dataset 1, the F-score for 𝛽 = 1 improved 
from 0.72 for the PHD least squares comparison method, to 0.82 for the CDF least squares 
comparison method, to 1.0 for the power spectral density and spectral angle mapper method. For 
this final identification algorithm, even the more challenging dataset 2 resulted in a high F-score 
for 𝛽 = 1 of 0.91. 
 While these radionuclide identification results are excellent, further work must go into 
handling the presence of multiple different radiation sources as well as the effects of shielding on 
the identification algorithms. Nevertheless, some degree of success was achieved with a LSU 
algorithm for identifying the components of mixed sources with up to three constituents.  
The designed RPM shows great promise in a lab controlled environment. However, more 
research and development would be required to bring the developed prototypes to market. Given 
more time and resources, more investigations into the choice of detector material and detector 
readout would be appropriate. Due to time and budget constraints, and early decision was made 
to design the prototypes with liquid organic scintillation detectors which were available to us in 
abundance. Due to the small probability of leaks developing in liquid scintillator detectors, solid 
detector materials are favored over liquids for field deployment. Alternative solid organic 
scintillator detectors should be further investigated for their RPM suitability. These materials 
include stilbene [43,51,67], a crystalline solid organic scintillator, as well as pulse shape 
discrimination-capable plastic organic scintillation detectors [96]. Further ROC curve and cost 
analysis would be required to investigate the feasibility of using these detectors in an RPM.  
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Furthermore, all measurements in this dissertation were performed in relatively climate 
controlled laboratory environments. RPMs in the field must cope with a wide range of operating 
temperatures, air humidity, and other climatic phenomena. Some detector materials, like stilbene, 
cannot cope with large temperature gradients [43,51,67,97,98]. Therefore, before field 
deployment all candidate RPM detector material performances would need to be studied in depth 
in a user controllable environmental chamber. 
Another potential area of further improvement and investigation pertains to the detector 
light readout. Photomultiplier tubes, as used in our RPM prototypes, have two significant 
drawbacks. Photomultiplier tubes requires high voltage to operate, and they take up a lot of 
volume relative to the active detector volume. Solid state readouts, like SiPMs, have emerged as 
a viable alternative to photomultiplier tubes. SiPMs require low voltage to operate, and only take 
up a small fraction of the volume of photomultiplier tubes [43]. However, each individual SiPM 
only reads out a small surface area, so there exist associated physical and cost challenges with 
expanding the use of SiPMs to large arrays of larger volume detectors, as would be likely in an 
RPM application. 
Finally, further studies are needed to investigate the RPM response to high activity 
gamma-ray photon sources. The digitizer uses an acquisition time window 100s of nanoseconds 
in length for each pulse above the set energy threshold. In the presence of a high activity source 
(GBq or higher), the probability of measuring multiple gamma-ray photons within this set time 
window increases substantially. Such pulses are often referred to as double pulses or pile-up 
pulses. If not corrected for, double pulses would be treated as a single pulse with a very large tail 
integral, leading to the misclassification of double pulses from gammas as a single neutron pulse. 
However, current research into double pulse cleaning and/or recovery could be implemented in 
the RPM algorithms to deal with the issue of double pulses [99].   
Despite these outstanding challenges, several RPM prototypes were developed, built, and 
tested rigorously under a variety of testing conditions. The results should provide encouragement 
to the prospects of commercializing 
3
He-free RPMs, and RPMs capable of distinguishing SNM 
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Appendix A                                                                                        
RPM XML File Output Example 
 
  
Figure A-1. Example of an XML file output for a single RPM occupancy for the pedestrian RPM tested at the 
2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at the European Commission JRC in Ispra, Italy, in February 2014. The standardized 
XML file contains vital information, including a time stamp, gross neutron and gamma-ray photon counts and count 












Appendix B                                                                               
Pedestrian RPM Results for 2
nd
 SCINTILLA Benchmark 
 
Table B-1.  Overview of test results for pedestrian RPM at 2
nd
 SCINTILLA benchmark at JRC Ispra, Italy, 
in February 2014. Test results include false alarm test (top left), neutron alarm tests (folders 1-16), as well as 
gamma-ray photon alarm and ID tests (folders 17-50). The ID results in this table still use a method with weighting 










































1 Cf-252 20000 5549 2.2 1 0.5 0 1.2 30 10-Feb 
     
2 Cf-252 20000 5549 1.2 1 0.5 0 1.2 30 10-Feb 0 19 30 30 
 
3 Cf-252 20000 5549 3 1 0.5 0 1.2 30 10-Feb 0 0 30 30 
 
4 Cf-252 20000 5549 2.2 1 0.5 0 1.9 30 10-Feb 0 0 30 30 
Two portals 
crashed. The 
test will be 
repeated. 




6 Cf-252 20000 5549 2.2 1 0.5 0 2.1 30 11-Feb 0 0 30 30 
 
7 Cf-252 10000 5987 2.2 1 0.5 0 1.2 30 11-Feb 2 0 28 28 
 
8 Cf-252 10000 5987 1.2 1 0.5 0 1.2 30 11-Feb 0 0 30 30 
 
9 Cf-252 20000 5549 2.2 1 0.5 8 1.2 30 11-Feb 16 1 14 14 
 
10 Cf-252 20000 5549 1.2 1 0.5 8 1.2 30 11-Feb 1 0 29 29 
 
11 Cf-252 10000 5987 2.2 1 0.5 8 1.2 30 11-Feb 30 0 0 0 
 
12 Cf-252 10000 5987 1.2 1 0.5 8 1.2 30 11-Feb 25 0 5 5 
 
13 Cf-252 10000 5987 2.2 1 0.5 4 1.2 30 11-Feb 15 0 15 15 
 




15 Cf-252 20000 5549 2.2 1 0.5 4 1.2 30 11-Feb 0 0 30 30 
 
16 Cf-252 20000 5549 1.2 1 0.5 4 1.2 30 11-Feb 1 18 29 29 
 
17 Co-60 259 591 2.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 11-Feb 0 30 0 5 
 
18 Co-60 259 591 1.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 17 
 
19 Co-60 259 591 2.2 0 0 0 2.5 30 12-Feb 1 29 0 0 
Vehicular 
limits 
20 Co-60 259 591 1.2 0 0 0 2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 3 
Pedestrian 
limits 
21 WGPu 93% CBNM93 2.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 13 
 
22 WGPu 93% CBNM93 1.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 17 
 
23 WGPu 93% CBNM93 2.2 1 0 0 1.2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 2 
 
24 WGPu 93% CBNM93 1.2 1 0 0 1.2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 0 
 
25 Ba-133 110 6505 2.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 12-Feb 8 22 0 3 
 






























1.2 0 0 0 2 30 12-Feb 0 30 0 10 
 
31 Co-57 143, 61 
 
2.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 13-Feb 11 19 0 15 
 
32 Co-57 143, 61 
 




















 1.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 13-Feb 0 30 0 16  
36 Cs-137 370 
 
2.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 13-Feb 0 30 0 4 
 
37 Cs-137 370 
 
1.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 13-Feb 0 30 0 17 
 
38 Cs-137 3700 
 
2.2 3 0 0 2.1 30 13-Feb 0 30 0 0 
 
39 Cs-137 3700 
 
























2.2 0 0 0 1.2 30 13-Feb 0 31 0 26 
 
44 Cs-137 370000 
 
2.2 0 0 0 1.2 6 14-Feb 0 6 6 6 
 
45 Cs-137 370000 
 













 2.2    1.2 6 14-Feb 0 6 6 6 


















 1.2 0 0 0 1.2 40 14-Feb 0 40 0 0 
Added 
another 430 











Table B-2. Radionuclide identification results using SAM on power spectral densities of measured CDFs of thirty datasets of ~1000 good pulses of 
99m
Tc 
measured with the 7.6 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detector. These measured spectra are compared the reference spectra for 
each of the thirteen radionuclides measured with the pedestrian RPM. The lowest SAM value corresponds to the best identification match. For this scenario, all 
thirty measurements of 
99m


















Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Am241 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
Ba133 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 
Co57 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Co60 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
Cs137 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
HEU 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 
Ra226 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.017 
WGPu 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
Ga67 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 
I123 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
I131 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
In111 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Tc99 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Tl201 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Result Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 Tc99 
99 
 
Table B-3. Radionuclide identification results using SAM on power spectral densities of measured CDFs of thirty datasets of ~400 good pulses of 
99m
Tc 
measured with the 7.6 cm diameter cylindrical volume EJ309 organic liquid scintillation detector. These measured spectra are compared the reference spectra for 
each of the thirteen radionuclides measured with the pedestrian RPM. The lowest SAM value corresponds to the best identification match. For this scenario, only 
28 of thirty measurements of 
99m






Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Am241 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 
Ba133 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Co57 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Co60 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Cs137 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 
HEU 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Ra226 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 
WGPu 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
Ga67 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 
I123 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
I131 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015 
In111 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
Tc99 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Tl201 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 
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